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Negotiation consists of a sequence of activities that occur before, during, and after the bargaining 
process of exchanging offers and counteroffers (Geertz, 1978; Williams, 1985; Zartman & 
Berman, 1983). It is a central process in many social contexts, especially those that involve 
exchange of goods or resources or redefining patterns of interdependence, such as when making 
sales, or business acquisitions. Because of its importance in social life, expert practitioners and 
social scientists have been attempting to investigate and understand this process for a very long 
time. The resulting prescriptive theories of negotiation serve to guide the thoughts and actions of 
negotiators who follow the advice contained within.  
The first aim of this dissertation is to examine those prescriptive theories, in particular the 
prescriptive theories generated using social science methods. Such theories are used in the 
training of students in business schools, and so are influential in shaping the thoughts and actions 
of business professionals. But such theories may be incomplete, as some critics have noted that 
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research focuses around the bargaining aspect of negotiations (Barley, 1991; Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993). Although those comments were based on narrative reviews of the literature, they pose 
important reflexive and practical questions. Was the organizational research on negotiation 
focused too narrowly on measuring only one aspect of negotiations?  
To address this question, I conduct two studies in Chapter 1. In Study 1, I aim to systematically 
examine empirical research on negotiations, to formally test Barley and Pruitt and Carnevale’s 
hypothesis. In Study 2, I compare prescriptive theories generated from social scientific research 
to prescriptive theories generated by experts in different domains of practice, in order to test 
whether prescriptions generated using social science focus on bargaining aspects as compared to 
prescriptions generated by experts in a variety of social contexts, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, sales, and law enforcement. Preliminary evidence in these studies provide support 
for the hypotheses; results for Study 1 suggest social scientific research on negotiations 
overwhelmingly measures behavior in the bargaining aspect of negotiation, and results in Study 
2 suggest a significant concentration of advice in the bargaining phase of negotiation in books 
authored by social scientists as compared to expert practitioners.  
Although much has been learned by studying the bargaining process, many consequential 
negotiation behaviors that occur before and after the bargaining process have been left largely 
unexamined. For example, diplomats report spending 75% of their time in preparation for 
negotiations (Zartman, 2006). Poor performance following mergers and acquisitions have 
inspired books that solely target the post-merger integration process (e.g., After the Merger: 
Managing the Shockwaves; Pritchett, 2014). Few methods exist to measure behavior in pre- and 
post- bargaining phases. Progress in describing and theorizing about these aspects, will require 
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the development of theory that can be used to motivate future inquiry, and methodological tools 
researchers can deploy to study those aspects.  
Studies in Chapter 2 outline efforts to develop theory and measurement tools that address the 
extended negotiation process. Study 3 utilizes a novel approach to generating theory about the 
individual differences antecedents to effective negotiation behaviors. To sample insights from 
field research, I sample prescriptions about effective negotiation behaviors from a wide range of 
expert sources. To utilize elements of formal theory, I recruited individual differences experts to 
provide ratings of the extent of correlation that should exist between the Big Five personality 
factors and effective behaviors. Results showed a clear role for conscientiousness across phases 
of negotiation.  
Study 4 outlines the development of the Negotiation Behavior Inventory (NBI) – a theory based 
measure of negotiation that samples effective behaviors from prescriptive theories of expert 
practitioners in a variety of social contexts, as well as from psychological research. This tool 
may facilitate measurement of behaviors in negotiation phases underemphasized in scientific 
studies. Studies that detail its development, and validation are outlined, as is a study of individual 
differences on negotiation behaviors. The NBI has the potential to contribute to the development 
of scientific theory on pre- and post- negotiation processes. It also has potential to influence 
organizational outcomes, namely in enhancing the capability to select and train people for 
effective negotiation. 
Study 5 demonstrates the role of individual differences in creating and claiming value in 
negotiation. In the context of a complex simulation, the study demonstrated that higher levels of 
conscientiousness were related to larger value claimed (i.e., individual gain), while high levels of 
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conscientiousness and reasoning ability combined were related to greater joint value generated 
by a dyad.  
Overall, this work yields important insights about the study of negotiation, and addresses 
important gaps in the understanding of negotiation processes. Chapter 1 compares and contrasts 
organizational researchers’ insights about negotiation to other domains of negotiation study to 
reveal significant gaps in understanding preparation and implementation phases of negotiation. 
Chapter 2 generates theory and tools that can be used to study those aspects, and reveals 
conscientiousness and reasoning ability to predict effectiveness.  
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Chapter 1: Examining Social Science and 
Practitioner Theories of Negotiation  
 
 
 
“I believe that more training is desperately needed in the art and science of negotiating, 
and in the art and science of intervening. Such training would be appropriate for 
diplomats, military officers, lawyers, politicians, businessmen, and ordinary citizens who 
may expect at some time or another to be embroiled in situations with serious conflicts of 
interest among contending parties.” (Raiffa, 1982, p. 8-9) 
 
1.1 The Demand for a Social Science of Negotiation 
Effectively navigating social contexts that require conflict resolution, or allocation of resources 
is a timeless pursuit, and so Raiffa’s recommendation for greater training in negotiation 
effectiveness remains relevant today. Being effective in negotiations means having an ability to 
avoid undesirable outcomes, such as avoiding harm and loss of life when law enforcement 
officers interact with the public (Police Executive Research Forum, 2015), an unsuccessful 
merger or acquisition of a firm is associated with significant loss of value, (Agrawal & Jaffe, 
2000; Buono & Bowditch, 2003), and the escalation of international disputes can lead to open 
conflict (Zartman & Berman, 1983). Prescriptive theories of negotiation generated by social 
scientists represent a growing source of practical advice. The authors aim to deliver evidence-
based recommendations from observing and describing behavior in the context of formal studies 
(Thompson, 2006). In this chapter, I analyze how negotiation scholars within the field of 
organizational behavior conduct empirical research and generate prescriptive theories of 
2 
 
negotiation, in order to understand the nature of the prescriptive theories negotiation scholars 
assert will be effective in resolving real disputes. I further compare prescriptive theories 
generated by negotiation scholars to those generated by expert practitioners in law enforcement, 
sales, mergers and acquisitions, marriage counseling, or social contexts in which negotiations 
skills are required. The aim will be to compare the conceptualization of effectiveness as 
espoused in the two sources of prescriptive theories.   
1.1.1 Attempts to Generate Prescriptive Theory Using Psychological 
Research  
A stated goal of organizational research on negotiation is to serve as the basis for a universal 
prescriptive theory applicable across social contexts. In a handbook of negotiation research 
Thompson states: “We think that it is the cry for best practices and ways to improve performance 
that helps negotiation theory to be stronger.” (2006, p. 3). Indeed, scientists have been active in 
generating prescriptive theories on the topic, as evidenced by the publication of books of 
negotiation marketed to the general public. They contain advice, and claim applicability of the 
advice in a number of domains. For example, Bazerman and Neale in their book Negotiating 
Rationally, state: “We’ve summarized why managers make these errors, and how you can avoid 
them to become a more rational negotiator.” (Bazerman & Neale, 1992, p. vii).  
Despite the progress made, surveys of empirical scholarship on negotiation reveal researchers 
have made design choices that are unrepresentative of negotiations in the field. In reviewing 
decades of marketing negotiations research, Eliashberg, Lilien, and Kim (1995) demonstrate that 
social scientists assume characteristics about negotiations that diverge significantly from many 
negotiations in the field. For example, 28% of research articles they examine feature zero sum 
games, yet only 3% of case studies of real negotiations had such features. Similarly, Bendersky 
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and McGinn (2010) demonstrate a striking pattern of assumptions about the nature of the 
negotiation process. In reviewing 16 years of organizational research on negotiation in 
management journals, they reveal 51% of articles studied negotiations in the context of a single 
shot interaction. This assumption may be unrealistic, because many negotiations take place in the 
context of a continuing relationship (Barley, 1991; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1995). As an 
example, colleagues at work might engage in negotiations to divide responsibility for shared 
duties that arise in the workplace.  
For organizational research to provide useful prescriptions about negotiations, it must have as its 
foundation an accurate description of the negotiation process. In the next section, I draw from 
scholarship outside of organizational research that describe negotiation to be an ordered 
sequence of actions. Then I draw on commentaries of organizational scholarship to formulate 
hypotheses about the limitations in the way negotiation is studied.  
1.1.2 Convergence on A Multi-Phase Theory of Negotiations  
Negotiation is defined as a process by which people resolve disputes, set the terms of exchange, 
or jointly plan for the future (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Raiffa, 1982). 
Moreover, negotiated agreements require action from the self and counterpart to fulfill the 
agreement, and are often accompanied by a fixed, or implied timeframe for the act of 
implementation. This means that not every exchange is a negotiated one. For instance, parties 
may engage in exchange in which debts or obligations are only implied (Befu, 1977; Fiske, 
1992). For example, friends may engage in an unplanned exchanges of favors, or even provide a 
one-way flow of resources to another without any direct expectation of repayment. Likewise, 
parenting may involve a one-way provision of support for the child, with little concrete 
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expectation of return. Social contexts or processes that feature such generalized exchange are 
unlikely to involve explicit negotiation of terms.  
Theories of negotiation derived in social scientific fields outside of the organizational field 
describe a converging description of the negotiation process. Scholars in fields as diverse as 
anthropology, legal studies, and international relations have generated descriptive theories of 
negotiation derived from observation of that arise from attempts at dispute resolution or 
exchange within a fixed or implied timeline. Those descriptive theories converge on a three-
phase structure to negotiation, which provides initial evidence for an ordered structure to the 
negotiation process. In the following paragraphs, I provide brief outlines of the processes they 
describe.  
Philip H. Gulliver, an anthropologist who observed labor management and land disputes using 
inductive methods, describes multiple phases to the dispute resolution process (Gulliver, 1979). 
For a dispute to occur, at least one party must first recognize a dispute to be resolved, such as 
grievances over working conditions, or a perception of a debt that remains unpaid. Parties then 
decide on a location in which negotiations will take place. Once gathered, parties then discuss 
the nature of the dispute itself, in order to establish a common understanding of the dispute. Once 
parties agree there is a dispute to be resolved, they establish maximal limits to the dispute, in 
terms of what can be negotiated, then state their initial positions. Negotiators in these phases may 
hold hostile dispositions toward each other, or express hostility when describing the slights, 
harms, and insults that led to the dispute itself. That is, considerable effort is expended by the 
parties to legitimate the need to negotiate to their counterpart.  
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Once a substantive first offer is made, negotiators behave in a more cooperative manner as they 
attempt to find solutions to resolve the dispute. An offer is substantive if it is perceived as an 
attempt to bridge the differences in the initial positions. Parties further discuss the list of issues to 
be bargained over, and through further exploration, may discover a viable bargaining range. The 
parties may be able to reach an agreement by making incremental concessions to converge with 
the counterpart’s last offer. Substantive bargaining (i.e., making and exchanging offers) occurs 
only after an extensive process of coordination between parties.  
If an agreement is reached, parties are said to maintain their cooperative stance, as they work to 
implement the terms of agreement. A ritualistic affirmation of the terms, such as a ceremony, or 
the signing of a contract follows the agreement. Such acts lend legitimacy to the agreement. 
Finally, the promised goods and services are exchanged.  
Gulliver’s description outlines a sequence of events, marked by key transitions. First are the set 
of actions required to begin bargaining process. Contacting the counterparty, establishing the 
procedural elements of the negotiation, coming to a shared understanding of the nature of the 
dispute, and establishing maximal limits to the dispute, are actions that occur prior to the first 
offer, and facilitate the bargaining process to follow. These actions are described to be 
contentious, since parties are discussing harms inflicted by the counterpart.  
Second are the set of bargaining activities that comprise substantive offer making, deciding on a 
list of issues to be negotiated, and then engaging in final bargaining to bring about agreement. 
These actions are said to be conducted in a more cooperative manner than before the first offer is 
made, because parties are involved in a joint decision making process in an attempt to resolve the 
dispute. 
6 
 
Following an agreement are actions that facilitate its implementation. Rituals conducted to affirm 
the deal could be viewed as an attempt to build commitment to implementing the deal. It stands 
to reconcile parties negotiating peace after violence, or for parties who have a history of conflict. 
Implementation of the deal requires cooperative actions from the counterpart, and marks the end 
of the negotiation process, although it may not necessarily mark the end of an interdependent 
relationship with the counterpart.  
The process Gulliver observed consists of three distinct phases that comprise of actions prior to, 
during, and following the bargaining process. Theories of negotiation derived from the 
observation of business and international relations also converge on a three-phase structure.  
I. William Zartman is an international relations scholar who has significant experience in 
researching international negotiations. He conducted interviews with 85 high level diplomats and 
one head of state about international negotiations (Zartman & Berman, 1983). The first phase 
concerns diagnosing the problem to be resolved. This stage is significant in influencing 
subsequent phases and negotiation outcomes, and so diplomats report spending 75% of the total 
time spent negotiating on this initial phase (Zartman, 2006). Diagnosis involves defining the 
nature of the conflict or opportunity, comparing the current situation to similar cases, gathering 
information about precedents, attempting to discover each party’s interests, and to understand the 
counterpart’s affective state regarding the situation. The second phase involves formulating a 
solution to the conflict or problem. A process of problem solving with a counterparties involve 
establishing a shared understanding of the problem, and defining its solution in general 
principles. The third stage involves translating the agreement into specifics, so that it can be 
implemented by the parties. Agreements are not seen to be the end of the process, because even 
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if agreements are reached, disagreements about the specific details of the agreement may derail 
the execution of the agreement.  
Gerald Williams (1985) is a legal scholar who interviewed parties involved in 150 legal 
negotiations, including the lawyers, clients, along with opposing counsel as well as their clients. 
He describes a three phase structure to legal negotiations. In the first phase, lawyers are 
concerned with preparing for the initial acts of bargaining. Lawyers establish relationships with 
the opposing counsel, and state their opening positions to each other. This entails describing the 
dispute as claimed by each party, and a suggestion to remedy the dispute. The second phase 
involves bargaining. Lawyers attempt to move their counterpart from their opening positions, 
engage in a pattern of compromise or concession making, and attempt to persuade their 
counterpart to accept a solution that may satisfy both parties’ interests. In the third phase, parties 
must decide to either reach a settlement outside of court or continue their conflict in a courtroom. 
If an agreement is reached, lawyers work to specify the agreement in detail, in order to ensure 
the agreement is implementable.   
All three models of negotiation are derived from observation of negotiations as manifested in 
different field settings. They provide evidence for conceptualizing negotiations as an ordered 
sequence of processes1. The start of bargaining (i.e., the first offer), and the reaching of an 
agreement represent salient events that change the nature of the interaction between the parties. 
Pre-bargaining processes are dominated by attempting to collect information and to establish 
conventions for further discussion. Parties state their perception of the dispute or opportunity, but 
                                                 
1 Despite proposing sequential models, both Zartman and Gulliver posit that it is possible for negotiators to 
backtrack to an earlier process/phase, or to skip ahead. It is certainly possible for negotiators to realize that they do 
not share a common definition of the dispute when they are bargaining, necessitating a redefinition of the agenda. 
They can also skip bargaining and move to implementation if initial offers are accepted.  
8 
 
little effort is taken to persuade or to make substantive demands. Once a first offer is made, the 
parties engage in a collective process to reach an agreement that could satisfy their collective 
interests. Reaching an agreement does not end the process. An agreement reveals the terms of an 
agreement but does not specify how they will be carried out by each party. Planning and 
discussing the details to ensure agreements are implemented mark the processes in the post-
bargaining phase.  
1.2  Empirical Studies of Negotiation in Organizational 
Behavior 
Examining the descriptive theories derived from real negotiations reveals that it consists of a 
sequence of activities that unfold over time. But narrative reviews of the empirical research on 
negotiations within organizational behavior suggests a narrow focus on the bargaining phase. 
Barley (1991), in commenting on the state of conflict management research, posits that empirical 
studies often characterize conflict management as a process that occurs free of context. That is, 
researchers often place individuals in conflict situations, but without a meaningful prior 
relationship with the counterparty, as would be the case if participants negotiate with a 
counterpart with whom they were randomly assigned in an experimental study. In addition, it is 
rare for researchers to study the interdependent relationship between parties after agreements 
have been reached. Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) made similar observations, commenting that the 
psychological study of negotiations have little to reveal about processes that occur in the pre-
bargaining phase: “There has been very little research on pre-negotiation activities” (p. 201). 
Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) also comment that post-bargaining activities are rarely examined: 
“… we are woefully ignorant about the post-negotiation period.” (p. 201). Suggesting 
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implementation processes are rarely modeled or studied. Mislin, Campagna, and Bottom (2011) 
reiterated this claim in a more recent narrative review.  
If organizational research on negotiation does not measure behavior in the pre- or post- 
bargaining phases, that may highlight a problematic bias in the program of organizational 
research on negotiation. A lack of theory and measurement on those phases signals the inability 
to provide effective prescriptive theory about much of the negotiation process, because 
bargaining may only comprise a minority of the time spent. Zartman (2006) reports that 
diplomats can spend 75% of their time on pre-bargaining activities.  
Empirically testing the conclusions of both Barley’s (1991) and Pruitt and Carnevale’s (1993) 
narrative review will contribute to more fully understanding the nature of negotiations research, 
and the potential it has to generate useful prescriptive theories. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 1. Empirical studies of negotiation will focus measurement on the bargaining 
phase of negotiations.  
In particular, I examine social psychological studies of negotiation, because that has been the 
most prolific discipline in producing empirical research on the topic. It is responsible for 70% of 
empirical research in top tier management journals published between 1990 and 2005 
(Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). If empirical studies of negotiation truly place emphasis on the 
bargaining phase, it implies that scientific efforts to measure, and describe processes that occur 
outside of the bargaining phase may be skewed, and thus identify avenues for new research 
initiatives and improved prescription.  
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1.3  Study 1 – Research Methods Used in Psychological 
Studies of Negotiation  
Do negotiations researchers focus on the bargaining phase of negotiations? Pruitt and 
Carnevale’s (1993) claim that social psychological studies of negotiation reveal little about pre- 
and post- bargaining processes reflects a narrative review of the state of research almost 20 years 
ago. Systematically testing this question with an updated set of studies would serve to illuminate 
the pattern of research since that original claim. If methods and measures used to study 
negotiation do not sufficiently sample the complete negotiation process, the ability to theorize 
about, and derive prescriptions for negotiations may be constrained.  
A study’s ability to reveal information about each of the negotiation phases should be indicated 
by the list of measures in the study. Measurement underlies the ability to make inferences about 
the constructs under study. If organizational researchers all make similar methodological choices 
that result in measurement of the bargaining phase of negotiations, but relatively few, or no 
measurement of the pre- or post- bargaining phase of negotiations, one can infer that the 
collection of research can make fewer, or no statements about the nature of the processes that are 
measured with less frequency. Thus, tallying the relative frequency of the measurements made 
about each phase will serve as a means to operationalize Pruitt and Carnevale’s claims about the 
extent to which social psychological studies can shed insight into negotiation phases.  
The observationally derived descriptive theories of negotiation by Gulliver (1979), Williams 
(1985), and Zartman and Berman (1983) provides a general conceptual framework for 
classifying behaviors in each negotiation phase. Their descriptive theories point to three distinct 
phases, separated by transition points. The first substantive offer separates the pre-bargaining and 
bargaining phases. Before a first offer is made, parties can engage in preparatory behavior, such 
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as researching the facts around the dispute or opportunity, and set goals and priorities for the 
negotiation (Williams, 1985; Zartman & Berman, 1983). Parties may convince the counterpart 
that a negotiation is necessary, and make arrangements to prepare the venue in which future 
bargaining will take place (Gulliver, 1979).  
A substantive first offer serves as a transition point to the bargaining phase. In this phase, parties 
decide on a final list of issues to negotiate, and make and exchange proposals (Gulliver, 1979; 
Williams, 1985; Zartman & Berman, 1983). An agreement concludes the bargaining process, and 
serves as the transition point which reorients parties to legitimating and implementing the deal 
(Gulliver, 1979; Zartman & Berman, 1983). Measures that match characteristic behavior in each 
negotiation phase, or described to occur before or after a transition point serve as cues that can 
form the basis of classifying each measure as belonging to a negotiation phase.  
For the purposes of identifying the pattern of research focus on each negotiation phase, not all 
measures may be equally informative. Research designs that selectively model aspects of the 
negotiation process can nonetheless produce measurements that take place outside the bounds of 
the phase being measured. For example, the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI; Curhan, 
Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006), a self-report measure of one’s satisfaction with the bargaining process 
and outcomes, refers to events in the bargaining phase, yet measurement typically takes place in 
the post-bargaining phase, because retrospective accounts serve as the basis for measurement. To 
be sure, these retrospective accounts are important, as perceptions of the bargaining process 
affect future behavior (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009). But measures that sample 
expectations of future events, or rely on retrospective accounts, such as measures of attitude, 
emotion, and individual differences, may not be attempting to measure the phase in which the 
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measurement takes place, but refer instead to past or future phases. As such they may be less 
informative as indicators of measurement of a particular phase.  
In contrast, measures of behavior, such as the value of negotiated agreements, communication 
patterns (Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1999), and implementation effort (Bottom, 
Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006) may be more indicative of measurement within a 
given negotiation phase, because they capture performative aspects of behavior in a given 
negotiation phase. For this reason, measured behaviors, or recordings of actions, are the focus of 
this study.   
An additional goal of the study is to examine the methodological practices exhibited in empirical 
organizational scholarship. In addition to the focus on the bargaining phase, Pruitt (2012) notes 
that much of the social psychological studies of negotiation have adopted an experimental 
method, operationally defining the negotiation process in terms of a stylized task adapted from 
Pruitt and Lewis (1975). The original task consisted of an experimental simulation conducted in 
a laboratory setting. Participants were randomly assigned instructional material for a buyer or 
seller role, the core of which included information about a fictional company each of the roles 
represented, and a payoff matrix which specified issues (iron, coal, sulfur), with each issue 
further decomposed to 9 levels (levels A-I). Each gradient within an issue was assigned a level of 
profit. Pruitt and Lewis used this experimental paradigm to test the effects of various 
manipulations regarding interpersonal styles pertaining to communication styles, aspiration 
levels, and problem solving orientation.  
Pruitt (2012), in a more recent narrative review, suggests that variants and developments of this 
experimental paradigm appear to have dominated empirical research on negotiations. If this 
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claim is true, it has implications for the aspects of the phenomena negotiation scholars are able to 
examine. The use of a single methodology limits the extent to which the scientists can 
understand a complex phenomenon (McGrath, 1981). In particular, experimental methods 
maximize the opportunity for precision in measurement, but sacrifice understanding of 
contextual factors and generality over actors (Deutsch & Krauss, 1965; McGrath, 1981). If 
similar methodological choices to adopt an experimental paradigm are made across most 
negotiation studies, then organizational researchers may be creating theories that lack relevance 
to instances of negotiation in social contexts, and also generate theory that may not be 
generalizable across actors.  
To examine patterns of measurement and research paradigms employed by negotiation scholars, 
I aim to systematically examine negotiation studies in ‘top-tier’ management journals in Study 1.  
1.3.1 Methods 
Article Sampling Procedure 
In order to sample social psychological papers on negotiation, I utilized an existing list of 
articles, compiled by Bendersky and McGinn (2010). Bendersky and McGinn’s selection of 
journals were based on Starbuck’s ranking of ‘top tier’ business journals. Starbuck’s designation 
of top tier journals depends on a journal’s impact factor, or the ratio of the number of times 
articles a journal has published compared to the total number of articles published in that journal. 
A high impact factor does not necessarily indicate higher levels of contribution, rigor, or 
standards of articles in a particular article, but does indicate the visibility of articles in that 
journal (Starbuck, 2011), or the extent to which academic scholars consume and cite research in 
those journals. Research questions and methods published in journals with high impact factors 
are consequential because they reflect the type of research questions and methodologies 
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researchers deem publishable, and thus guides the direction of future research (Judge, Cable, 
Colbert, & Rynes, 2007).  
Within the scope of journals considered by Bendersky and McGinn, I examined those in the 
domain of organizational psychology (Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
OBHDP; Journal of Applied Psychology, JAP; Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
JESP) or social psychology (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, JPSP; Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, PSPB). These journals not only represent the majority of the 
articles in the time period (157 articles out of 225, or 70% of total research output), but also 
represent the group of researchers Pruitt and Carnevale refer to in their claims.  
Bendersky and McGinn applied a number of criteria to generate a list of articles within those 
journals. They first searched within those journals for articles that contained the words 
“negotiat”, “bargain”, or “conflict”, in the title, key words or abstract. To retain empirical articles 
on negotiation, the list was further refined by dropping articles that contained only reviews or 
theory, referred to the efficacy of software packages, and examination of negotiations outside of 
an organizational context. The authors then read the abstract of each article, using Walton and 
McKersie’s (1965) definition of negotiation (“interaction of two or more complex social units 
which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence”, p. 3) to assess 
whether negotiation was the focus of each article. Using this criteria, the authors dropped articles 
in which no human parties were involved, and articles pertaining intrapsychic identity 
negotiation, team decision making in which there was no mixed motive component were also 
dropped.  
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The criteria either refer to methodologies used or the social context in which negotiation occurs. 
But they do not select on articles on the basis of their measurement of negotiation phases, 
qualifying the sample for hypothesis testing.  
Studies were the unit of analysis. Two articles, both meta-analyses (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; 
Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), were excluded from analyses because they did not contain 
primary data collection. A meta-analysis represents the aggregation of research designs and 
choices made primarily by researchers other than the original authors. Its inclusion would entail 
implicitly incorporating the studies sampled for the meta-analysis, or studies which I would not 
examine directly. It could also result in double sampling of behaviors if the meta-analysis 
included articles already sampled by Bendersky and McGinn. A total of 287 studies in 156 
articles were retained for analysis.  
Behaviors measured in each study were recorded. ‘Behaviors’ were defined as actions, or reports 
of actions during a negotiation. Such performative measures consisted of behaviors that were 
interpersonally directed (e.g., number of offers made, level of expressed affect toward 
counterpart, cooperative utterances), or the creation of plans. I included third party (e.g., research 
assistant coding of utterances, computer program reports of number of offers), second (i.e., 
counterpart report), and first party (i.e., self) reports of behaviors. Furthermore, I only counted 
behaviors that were of interest to the researcher. Variables collected for the sole purpose of 
conducting manipulation checks, or not reported in the results section were excluded from 
analyses. An exception to this rule was in coding negotiated outcomes. Because negotiated 
outcomes could be calculated in many ways – for example, a number of variables could be 
constructed using the outcomes of a study using a two party multi-issue payoff table, such as 
impasse rates, value of overall agreement, extent of logrolling, difference in outcome between 
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dyad members – negotiated outcomes were counted as a single instance of behavior. Variables 
such as affective states (e.g., felt anger/happiness), cognitions/attitudes (e.g., satisfaction with the 
agreement), individual differences (e.g., gender, personality), or behavioral intentions (e.g., 
intention to negotiate with the same counterpart in the future) were not counted as behaviors, and 
not retained in analyses.  
I classified each behavior as belonging to the pre-bargaining, bargaining, and post-bargaining 
phases, as guided by their measurement with respect to the first offer and the agreement. That is, 
behaviors measured before a first offer were classified as belonging to the pre-bargaining phase, 
and behaviors measured after an agreement were classified as belonging to the post-bargaining 
phase. This decision rule is consistent with the three phase negotiation structure derived from 
descriptive theories of negotiation (Gulliver, 1979; Williams, 1985; Zartman & Berman, 1983). 
Classification conducted by a single rater not naïve to expectations about the distribution of 
measurement efforts of organizational researchers may produce data of unknown reliability. 
Thus, a remaining task for future development of this study will be to recruit a coder blind to the 
hypotheses to classify a random sample of behaviors to test for the reliability of the data 
generated. 
In addition, I coded for the methodology used in each paper. Experimental designs that feature 
random assignment of participants, or studies in which the researcher manipulates the 
participant’s experience in either a laboratory, or online settings without random assignment 
procedures (e.g., a scenario study with no manipulated factors) were coded as being 
experimental. The specific type of experimental design was also recorded. Pruitt (2012) reveals a 
number of experimental approaches to studying negotiation, including prisoner’s dilemma 
games, distributive tasks, integrative bargaining tasks modeled on the Pruitt and Lewis (1975) 
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paradigm, and scenario studies, used to detect biases in judgment and decision making. In 
addition, designs in which participants were surveyed about their personal experiences, such as 
being asked about their cognitions, affect, and outcomes of employment negotiations were coded 
as survey designs. These categories served as the basis for classification of research designs.  
1.3.2 Results 
Research Designs Used to Study Negotiations  
The distribution of study designs are shown in Figure 1. Out of the 287 studies, 27% featured a 
single issue negotiation task, with another 4% consisting of ultimatum games (a special case of a 
single issue negotiation task)2. Twenty-nine percent of studies featured a variant of a multi-issue 
payoff chart game developed by Pruitt and Lewis (1975). Prisoner’s dilemma games, coalition 
games, and public goods games comprise another 13% of designs. Scenario studies comprised 
9% of study designs, with an additional 14% that used other experimental paradigms (e.g., 
responding to videos of negotiations, Thompson, 1995; third party intervention of disputes, 
Conlon & Ross, 1993). In all, 95% of study designs were experimental in nature, while the 
remaining 5% relied on survey designs. 
Behaviors Measured 
Six hundred and sixteen behaviors were measured across 287 studies. Classification of behaviors 
with reference to their measurement to the first offer and agreement revealed that 93% of 
behaviors (575 of 616) could be categorized as belonging to the bargaining phase (Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
2 An ultimatum game simulates a two-person bargaining task (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In the 
game, Person A presents two proposals to Person B regarding the division of a sum of money. One proposal is to 
accept a division of money proposed by Person A. The other is to reject the proposed division, in which case both 
Person A and Person B receive nothing.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Research Design Types.  
 
Behaviors studied in the bargaining phase consisted of actions that relate directly to issues or 
point values, such as the value of offers, counteroffer, agreement value, logroll value, number of 
offers, and concessions. Examples included tactic use (e.g., use of threats in negotiations; 
O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997), and utterances during bargaining (e.g., appeasing verbal 
utterances; Ohbuchi, Chiba, & Fukushima, 1996), and time spent negotiating (e.g., Bowles, 
Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). 
By way of contrast, 5% of behaviors (30 of 616) studied involved pre-bargaining behaviors. 
Examples include creation of negotiation goals (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993) preparing 
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Figure 2. Behaviors Measured in Pre-bargaining, Bargaining, and Post-bargaining Phases.  
 
questions to be asked in the upcoming negotiation (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004), stated 
strategies for the upcoming social dilemma task (Chen & Komorita, 1994). Finally, 2% of 
behaviors were classified to belong in the post-bargaining phase (11 of 616). Examples of 
behavior included those related to implementation processes, such as honoring vs. defecting from 
an agreement (Morgan & Tindale, 2002), job performance following employment negotiations 
(Ashford & Black, 1996), actual points pledged in a social dilemma game following stated 
pledges (Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data. Social psychological studies have focused to a great 
extent on the bargaining phase of negotiations. Subjecting the counts of behaviors in each phase 
Pre-bargaining
5%
Bargaining
93%
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bargaining
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to a Chi-squared test revealed a significant result χ2(2): 999.16, p < 2.2 x 10-16, with inspection of 
counts revealing a strong preference for measuring behaviors in the bargaining phase of 
negotiations.   
Discussion 
A survey of 16 years of empirical papers in JPSP, PSPB, JESP, OBHDP, and JAP reveal a 
strong monoculture of experimental research examining the bargaining phase of negotiations. 
95% of study designs were experimental in nature. When examining the variables measured and 
used for analysis, the results revealed a focus on the bargaining phase, with 93% of behaviors 
analyzed taking place during that phase. In most studies examined, there were strong indications 
that researchers exogenously determined the dispute/opportunity to be negotiated, the content of 
issues, maximal limits to issues, payoffs structures, conventions of negotiating, and partner 
selection before participants begin to bargain via the use of simulation methods.  
To my knowledge, this study is among the few to attempt a large scale survey of the research 
methods in the organizational scholarship of negotiation. A similar attempt to examine the way 
in which negotiation was operationally defined in empirical studies was Elishaberg and 
colleagues’ (1995) comparison of the characteristics of real marketing negotiations compared to 
the characteristics of negotiations research in marketing research. Those comparisons revealed a 
discrepancy between the two, suggesting limitations in the generality of the applications of the 
academic research on real marketing negotiations. Bendersky and McGinn’s (2010) investigation 
of organizational scholarship on negotiation resulted in similar conclusions, with the 
characteristics of academic research on organizationally relevant negotiation articles to show 
systematic similarity in assumptions, such as tendency to conceptualize negotiations as a single 
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shot interaction, which limits their applicability to real organizational settings. These prior 
studies have addressed the external validity of the research. The contribution of Study 1 was to 
examine how fully and representatively organizational scholarship has modeled negotiation 
processes with respect to descriptive models of negotiation derived from qualitative and 
observational methods. This study shows that at the level of measurement, organizational 
scholars systematically excluded behaviors relevant to pre- and post- bargaining phases of 
negotiation. Without measurement of behaviors in those phases, the creation of empirically 
supported theories of preparation and implementation – some of the most consequential 
behaviors in negotiation – will not be possible. Negotiation scholars will need to redress this 
imbalance in research practice in order to generate a more complete understanding of the 
negotiation process.  
A limitation of this study is that the classification of behavior to negotiation phase is currently 
completed by a single coder. To establish reliability in ratings, a second coder who is blind to the 
hypothesis will be needed to code a random sample a significant portion (20%) of the behaviors. 
Consistency in the ratings across raters will lend confidence to the reliability of the ratings, and 
estimates of the consistency of the classification method.  
Despite these limitations, the implications of similar methodological choices across studies is 
clear. This program of research can yield limited insight into pre- and post- bargaining behaviors. 
This observation is not made to suggest that such research, or the conclusions from such research 
are not internally valid or are somehow less useful. Indeed, this research has produced many 
valuable insights into how the pattern of offers and proposals shape the value of agreements 
(Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Larrick & Wu, 2007). Such research has produced relevant 
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implications for how people should behave with respect to thinking about and acting on 
proposals.  
In their narrative review, Pruitt and Carnevale’s (1993) asserted that the psychological study of 
negotiation available at the time revealed little about preparation and implementation processes, 
thought to be critical by observers of negotiations that occur in legal (Williams, 1985), domestic 
(Gulliver, 1979), and international relations contexts (Zartman, 2006). This study demonstrates 
that their assertion would apply to studies more than a decade after their comment. A systematic 
approach to the study of negotiation variables suggests a persistently strong concentration of 
research focus on the bargaining phase. These observations also support Barley’s (1991) more 
general observation that conflict resolution is studied within a narrow bracket of interaction 
defined by tasks that exclude the possibility of modeling contextual factors leading up to a 
dispute or opportunity, or model the set of interactions following the resolution of the conflict. 
Although these observations have been made in narrative reviews, this study quantifies the extent 
of the narrow bracketing that has occurred in research design. A lack of modeling and 
measurement of the pre- and post-bargaining phase should limit the extent to which 
organizational theories can provide generalizable implications for effectiveness in those phases. 
This is a testable hypothesis investigated in Study 2.  
1.4 Study 2 – Comparison of Prescriptive Theories of 
Negotiation Generated by Organizational Scholars and 
Expert Practitioners 
Being a central activity in resolving disputes and opportunities in numerous interpersonal, 
intergroup, and international contexts, the need to negotiate effectively is ubiquitous and 
enduring. An aim of organizational scholars to meet this need (Thompson, 2006), by producing 
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theories of negotiation that could be used to inform negotiators across social contexts. Intentions 
to produce such theories are evident in books about negotiations produced by organizational 
scholars for negotiators across a variety of social contexts. These intentions are evident in the 
covers and introductory sections of books written by organizational scholars. For example, in 
their book Negotiating Rationally, Bazerman and Neale (1992) suggest that “Whether you run a 
corporation, buy a used car, or sometimes disagree with a colleague or your spouse, you need to 
know how to negotiate.” (p. vii). Thompson (2013), in Truth about Negotiations, displays on the 
cover “Crack the code, and use it with anyone at any time”. Similarly, in Negotiation, Lewicki 
and Litterer (1985) suggest that the book’s approach was to “bargaining as a basic, generic 
human activity – a process that is often used in labor-management relations, in business deals 
like mergers and acquisitions and sales, in international affairs, but also in many different 
everyday activities. ... The structure and processes of negotiation are fundamentally the same at 
the personal level as they are at the diplomatic and corporate level” (p. 1). Organizational 
scholars have aspired to generate universal prescriptive theories of negotiation that can apply 
across social contexts.  
For such assertions about the generality of their theories to be valid, organizational scholars’ 
assumptions about the nature of the negotiation process must resemble those found in those 
social contexts. Given the results of Study 1, which shows the overwhelming majority of the 
measurements are made on the bargaining phase, such assumptions may not be accurate. More 
specifically, empirical studies focused measurement efforts on the bargaining phase, indicating 
the relative importance of that phase in the minds of organizational researchers. Yet descriptive 
theories of negotiation reveal expert negotiators to focus much of their efforts in the pre-
bargaining phase (Zartman, 2006). A more formal test of the proposition that the prescriptive 
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theories of negotiation generated by organizational scholars would not reflect the best practices 
of expert negotiators across various social contexts is the aim of this study.  
It is worth noting that because the need to negotiate has been ubiquitous and enduring, 
researchers in academic fields are not the only source of prescriptive theories about negotiations. 
Expert negotiators for centuries have been producing prescriptive theories of negotiations as they 
apply to particular social contexts. An example is de Callières’ (1716) On the Manner of 
Negotiating with Princes, which argues for the need to establish a program of training to produce 
a corps of diplomats. Derived from direct experience, it lays out prescriptions for negotiating in 
the European international relations context of that era. Similarly, prescriptive theories have been 
produced by experts in social contexts such as law, marriage counseling, law enforcement, 
mergers and acquisitions, and sales. These theories indicate how skilled negotiators should 
resolve conflicts in particular applied settings. Prescriptive theories generated by those experts in 
a specific social context are important. If they are influential, they not only guide the behavior of 
people in those social contexts, they also serve as indicators of effective behaviors in the specific 
social contexts that feature negotiations. In the section to follow, I argue for the value of expert 
generated theories of negotiation, despite the potentially informal and non-systematic methods 
used to arrive at the theory, by drawing analogies from general ability research.  
1.4.1 The Value of Tacit Knowledge in Generating Useful Theory 
Sternberg and colleagues (Sternberg, 1999; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981) 
argue that the scientific method is not the only route to creating useful knowledge about social 
phenomena. Instead, they argue for the existence and importance of tacit knowledge. Sternberg 
and colleagues define tacit knowledge as knowledge structures that feature a series of if-then 
statements that guide action in a given situation. Thus, tacit knowledge is procedural in nature, 
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and instrumental, in that it facilitates achieving desired outcomes. Finally, tacit knowledge is 
thought to be acquired without assistance from others.  
This form of knowledge generation stands in contrast to scientific notions of intelligence. The 
original intent of intelligence testing was to discriminate between children who are likely to 
succeed in academic settings (Binet & Simon, 1916), in order to appraise their chances of 
benefitting from the newly created public school system in France. Although, intelligence tests 
have become refined over time, the basic tenet of such testing has not changed: the tests measure 
abilities in analyzing abstract problems with defined solutions, something valued in academic 
settings (Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995). Such measures only modestly 
correlate with work performance, predicting around 4% of variance (Wagner & Sternberg, 
1985).  
People can and do develop expertise through the formation of knowledge structures developed 
through direct experience. Wagner and Sternberg (1985) showed empirical support for this 
proposition by constructing a method to measure tacit knowledge. They first created work related 
scenarios. Each scenario presented a goal the respondent must accomplish, in the presence of 
task or social conflicts. In their method, the scenario is followed by a number of possible 
behaviors (6 to 20) one could conceivably enact in that situation to achieve the goal. 
Respondents used a Likert-type scale to indicate which of the listed behaviors would be most 
important in reaching the goal. Wagner and Sternberg found significant differences in responses 
between more or less experienced academics, and business people. Tacit knowledge as revealed 
by these scenario choices proved to be predictive of consequential outcomes (e.g., for academics 
- number of publications; for business people - level in company, salary, work performance). 
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Moreover, tacit knowledge predicted work performance after controlling for scores on various 
measures of intelligence (Sternberg et al., 1995)3.  
Theories of negotiation, even if they are constructed through informal means can be informative 
because they have the potential to describe effective behaviors not modeled by social 
psychologists. They may be informative in revealing effective behaviors that occur prior to, and 
following bargaining, which prescriptive theories about negotiation may systematically 
undersample. Next, I argue that what Sternberg and colleagues refer to as ‘tacit knowledge’ can 
be codified, disseminated, and learned, without people directly having experience with a social 
context. 
1.4.2 Codification of Tacit Knowledge 
Sternberg and colleagues’ (1995) argue that tacit knowledge is acquired without the help of 
others (“low environmental support for acquisition”, p. 917), but this may not be an accurate 
view. People share task relevant knowledge among peers during informal interactions (Conlon, 
2004). Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that effective behaviors in social contexts are 
increasingly codified when jobs become professionalized. Noesner (2010) notes that the 
increasing professionalization of crisis negotiation has produced training programs, manuals, and 
organizational guidelines for people engaged in negotiations in a law enforcement setting. As 
people in a profession share or face similar situations, the need to develop and share knowledge 
that increases effectiveness appears to drive people to codify and distribute tacit knowledge. So 
although Sternberg conceptualized academic work to require individuals to develop their own 
                                                 
3 The parallels between the psychological study of intelligence and negotiations share striking similarities. Both 
efforts to study the phenomenon appear to have adhered to a limited definition of the construct. As Sternberg (1999) 
notes, the development of intelligence testing has focused on precision of measurement, at the expense of modeling 
and measuring the phenomenon as manifested in social contexts. A similar argument could be made for the study of 
negotiation, with the dominance of experimental paradigms facilitate precision in measurement, at the cost of 
understanding the phenomenon as manifested in social contexts.  
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stores of tacit knowledge, guidebooks exist to guide academics through various challenges 
unique to academic jobs (e.g., The Compleat Academic; Darley, Zanna, & Roediger, 2004). 
Noteworthy is that Sternberg himself has a chapter in The Compleat Academic aimed at helping 
academics obtain research grants. A similar process of codification of tacit knowledge is 
described in the distinct fields of marriage counseling and (Gottman, 1998), and sales (Rackham, 
2004).  
1.4.3 Social Contexts that Require Negotiation Ability 
Given initial evidence for the usefulness and the existence of codified theories of negotiation 
effectiveness in social contexts, what are the appropriate social contexts from which theories 
should be sampled? One pointer is the almost boilerplate list of activities social psychologists 
claim that their theories apply to: marriage counseling, legal settings, sales, mergers and 
acquisitions, and law enforcement (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010; 
Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1990, 2012). In the following 
sections, I discuss how each specific social context requires negotiation abilities in order people 
to be effective in that context.  
Marriages represent a public, contracted agreement regarding the level of intimacy and 
interdependency between two people, who publicly claim they will maintain a lifelong bond in in 
front of family, friends, and religious figures. In this relationship, couples must navigate the 
sharing of “emotional, intellectual, and economic assets” (Scott & Scott, 1998, p. 1254). Thus, 
relationship maintenance requires defining patterns of interdependence, and is analogous to what 
the industrial relations researchers Walton and McKersie (1966) described as 'attitudinal 
restructuring' in the process of collective bargaining between unions and management. They 
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defined it as a "system of activities instrumental to the attainment of desired relationship patterns 
between the parties" (p. 5). 
Legal work requires negotiations: “It is simply something lawyers do as part of their day’s work” 
(Williams, 1985, p. 1). Despite the stereotype that lawyers engage in a power contest in the 
courtroom, the vast majority of legal are settled outside the courtroom via negotiation 
(Alexander, 1991). Indeed, it would be a misnomer to classify negotiation as an “alternative” 
dispute resolution mechanism, given that it is increasing the norm for handling disputes 
(Honeyman & Schneider, 2006). In practice, lawyers must generally resolve differences on 
behalf of their client with one or more counterparties. Negotiation remains an important process 
for realizing opportunities for initiating, continuing, and terminating transactions in business, or 
resolving disputes (Williams, 1985).  
Mergers and acquisitions involve combining the operations and assets of two parties which have 
idiosyncratic cultural and operational differences. Thus, merging two or more business 
organizations requires substantial negotiation over the planning and execution of merging human 
resources, hierarchies, culture, and practices (Buono & Bowditch, 2003; Ernst & Young, 1994). 
That entails a complex, possibly recursive sequence of planning, bargaining, and implementation 
efforts to redefine the terms of interdependence between parties at an organizational level.  
A critical function of for-profit organizations is to sell. Whether the potential customer is an end 
consumer or other organizations, negotiated exchanges are important for generating revenue. As 
a result, many organizations have specialized experts in their workforce to engage in sales. 
Selling is more than haggling over quantity, quality, or price. Instead, effective sales involve 
building rapport with the counterpart, investigating the counterpart’s preferences, demonstrating 
29 
 
that the object for sale meets those needs, obtaining commitment for the proposed exchange, as 
well as monitoring satisfaction after the completed sale (Rackham, 1988). This description 
implies an extended sequence of activities that include pre- and post- negotiation activities as 
described by Gulliver (1979).  
Law enforcement involves public administration attempts to enforce rules and regulations set by 
elected governments, whether municipal, state, or federal. Although officers can use force to 
ensure compliance with laws, de-escalation techniques have become emphasized in the light of 
recent policing crises in which have resulted in fatalities (Police Executive Research Forum, 
2015). De-escalation techniques may be more effective in ensuring public safety and preventing 
injury, partly because they lead to increased rapport with the public (Police Executive Research 
Forum, 2015). One such method of policing used by the Manchester Police in the United 
Kingdom involves training them to gather information, ask questions, and to engage members of 
the public to solve problems: “It’s not just about ‘stop barking commands.’ It’s about 
communicating and trying to establish a connection, trying to engage, to break through whatever 
it is, to start some kind of negotiations.” (Police Executive Research Forum, 2015, p. 7).  
The social contexts described above reflect not only those organizational researchers claim their 
theories extend to. If the theories generated by organizational researchers are indeed applicable 
and appropriate for these contexts, the pattern of prescriptions in both organizational researcher 
and experts of social contexts should result in a similar proportion of prescriptions made about 
each phase. This argument assumes that the relative frequency of prescriptions about each phase 
indicates the importance of behaviors in each phase (i.e., more prescriptions in a given phase 
reflects greater importance of that phase). Similar to the logic that citation counts reflect the 
extent to which researchers consume and disseminate particular journals or journal articles  
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(Starbuck, 2011), I argue that the more that a phase is mentioned, differentiated, and prescribed 
behaviorally, the more likely it is that the phase is important from the viewpoint of an 
organizational researcher or expert. But as I describe in the following section, there are reasons 
to believe that patterns of prescriptions in the two sets of theories should differ. 
1.4.4 Comparing Prescriptive Theories by Organizational Researchers and 
Experts of Social Contexts 
The results of Study 1 suggest that if organizational researchers inform their theories of 
negotiation from the empirical research they generate, one can expect that much of the 
prescription to be made about behaviors in the bargaining phase of negotiations. Not only do 
organizational researchers tend to assume parties in a negotiation tend to negotiate in a single-
shot interaction (Barley, 1991; Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1995), 
design choices that serve to dull the mundane realism of an experimental study may influence the 
pattern of prescriptions that can be drawn from studies. For example, a participant assuming an 
experimenter imposed role via instructions in a briefing information results in a logically 
plausible way to model relational factors between parties. But participants in a laboratory setting 
typically do not have existing relationships with their counterparts (unless researchers explicitly 
recruit people with existing relationships; c.f. Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983). Such 
participants also do not have existing disputes, nor do they have expectations of a profitable 
continuing relationship with their negotiation counterpart outside the bounds of the sequence of 
interactions designed by an experimenter. Under such conditions, one can assume participants 
will conceive of their counterpart as a neutral, potentially anonymous party. But negotiations that 
occur in standing social contexts can arise out of a need to settle a dispute or by the prospect of a 
mutually beneficial profitable exchange.  
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Negotiations that occur in law enforcement or marriage counseling settings are typically the 
result of conflict between parties. Parties experience perceived and real harms, but engage in 
negotiation to address outstanding issues. Significant work to build trust and repair relationships 
may be required before substantial bargaining can occur in those contexts (Noesner, 2010; 
Gottman & Silver, 1994), which suggest additional prescriptions made about the pre-bargaining 
phase of negotiation.  
Although driven by different concerns, experts of sales and mergers and acquisitions may also 
emphasize the importance of pre-bargaining research. In the sales context, researching the needs 
of a sales prospect is important to the sales process; knowing about and satisfying those needs 
lead to completed sales (Rackham, 1988). In the context of mergers and acquisitions, 
considerable work must be performed after merger/acquisition bargaining is complete, to bring 
about the merging of institutional cultures, work practices, organizational hierarchies, and to 
cope with employee uncertainties about their future (Buono & Bowditch, 2003).  
These patterns contrast with the measurement efforts of organizational scholars, who have 
focused their efforts on the bargaining phase of negotiations. The premise of hypothesis 2 is that 
prescriptive theories generated by organizational scholars will commit a greater proportion of 
advice to the bargaining phase. 
Hypothesis 2: Prescriptive theories of negotiation generated from psychological theories 
will result in a greater proportion of advice given in the bargaining phase of 
negotiations.  
1.4.5 Methods 
Overview of Procedure 
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The unit of analysis is advice in texts authored by organizational scholars or experts from 
contexts of marriage counseling, crisis negotiations, mergers and acquisitions, sales, and legal 
negotiations. Advice provides an indicator of underlying prescriptive theories about negotiation, 
or negotiation in a particular social context that requires negotiation ability to be effective. 
Advice contains recommendations about how to behave, think, or evaluate stimuli in a way 
thought to maximize effectiveness. I sampled advice by generating a list of influential books 
authored by organizational scholars as well as authors from social context. I transcribed and 
classified the advice given to either the pre-bargaining, bargaining, or the post-bargaining phase, 
as described in Study 1. I then compared the distribution of advice applicable to each phase 
across social contexts.  
Prescriptive Theory Sampling Procedure 
Books were selected as the medium from which prescriptive theories were sampled. Books were 
chosen over other media, such as instructional videos, conference presentations, op-ed columns, 
brochures, and journal articles, because books represent a well-established, general purpose text 
medium used by both organizational scholars as well as expert practitioners in a very wide range 
of social contexts. Although I know of no data, theory, or sources that support this assertion, 
book publication has been used by experts (e.g., de Callières, 1716) and organizational scholars 
to disseminate prescriptive theory to the general public. Moreover, books can be made to 
sufficient length to fully disseminate the implications of complex theories. Other types of media, 
such as a brochure or conference presentation constitute short form, abbreviated formats that 
may only have sufficient bandwidth to house narrowly selected aspects of theories. Thus, books 
were chosen as the media from which to sample prescriptive theories.  
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In order to enumerate a list of books on each context, I surveyed lists of books enumerated by 
professional associations, or by surveying book reviews. A ‘book’ could be an instructional text 
(i.e., textbook or manual), as well as other monograph-type text. For books on the social 
psychological study of negotiation, the International Association of Conflict Management lists 
books written by its members (http://www.iacm-conflict.org/Publications/books). From that list, 
I identified a list of 33 books on negotiation by reading their descriptions on Amazon.com. To 
ensure sampling on books authored by social psychologists, I verified each author’s membership 
in one of the three major social psychological associations: Society for Experimental Social 
Psychology, Social Psychology Network, and Society for Personality and Social Psychology. 
Books were included in the sample if they are authored or co-authored by a social psychologist. 
In addition, books authored by researchers who have authored or co-authored an Annual Review 
of Psychology on the topic of negotiations were also included in the sample.  
To sample prescriptive theories of negotiations in legal contexts, I sampled books classified as 
being relevant to negotiations from the American Bar Association’s bookstore, yielding 34 
books. 
For the remaining contexts, professional associations provided neither a list of books by 
members nor had a publishing division of the association that puts out books. For these contexts, 
I searched for book reviews in journals or databases that focused on the social context. Book 
reviews published by professional associations or in outlets consumed by practitioners are likely 
to feature books of interest to its members and guide its audience about the quality of the book. 
In the absence of a list or repository of books on any one subject matter, or a way to screen the 
quality of the book, book reviews served to guide selection based on relevance and quality. Thus, 
review content guided inclusion in the sample. Any book that received neutral or approving 
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review was retained in the sample. Books that received negative review as well as those that did 
not appear to contain advice were excluded from the sample. The latter set included historical 
accounts of particular instances of negotiation phenomena (e.g., case studies), biographies, and 
books that largely presented data.  To insure conservatism about selection in sampling, whenever 
insufficient information was provided in the book review, the book was retained in the sample. 
All of the sampling procedures detailed below were conducted in February and March of 2015. 
The goal of this sampling method was to select on books that received tacit or explicit approval 
from subject area experts.  
For books on marriage counseling, I searched for all reviews contained in the journals of the 
National Council on Family Relations (Journal of Marriage and Family, Journal of Family 
Theory & Review, and Family Relations: Interdisciplinary Journal of Applied Family Studies). A 
pool of 1347 book reviews of books on marriage were found, of which 55 received approval in 
reviews and appeared to contain advice.  
For books on law enforcement, I searched for book reviews in ProQuest’s Criminal Justice 
Periodicals database. The database indexes journals on corrections, criminal justice, criminal 
law, and related topics. Using the keywords “crisis negotiations”, “police negotiations”, and 
“hostage negotiations”, a pool of 230 book reviews on law enforcement negotiations were found, 
of which 12 received approval and appeared to contain advice.   
For books on sales and mergers and acquisitions, I searched for book reviews on EBSCOhost’s 
Business Source Complete. Business Source Complete indexes both academic journals on 
business topics, including marketing, sales, and accounting. In addition, trade magazines and 
periodicals aimed at business professionals, such as the Economist, and MIT Sloan Management 
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Review, and newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal are also indexed. I used the keywords 
“sales” and “mergers and acquisitions” to search among book reviews. A pool of 1347 book 
reviews on sales revealed 221 books that received approval from reviewers and appeared to 
contain advice, and a pool of 233 book reviews on mergers and acquisitions revealed 67 books 
that received approval from reviewers and appeared to contain advice.   
Sample Reduction 
To sample from the list generated by the procedure above, I obtained the sales rank achieved by 
each book on Amazon.com, a major online retailer, during February and March of 2015. Top 
selling status provides evidence of the extent to which the bodies of advice are influential among 
its practitioners. I sampled advice from the top ten books in each category.  
To determine sales rank, I visited every listing of the candidate books on Amazon.com. Amazon 
may sell the same book under multiple listings since private sellers can independently generate a 
listing of a used book, and ranks are calculated for each listing or version of a book (i.e., 
electronic audiobook, audio CD, electronic, hardcover, paperback). To ensure comparison across 
ranks, I only examined ranks for hardcover and paperback versions of the books. Electronic 
books have a separate ranking system, which is not directly comparable to book rankings for the 
other formats. Those books with multiple editions, either through revision, or with different 
introduction dates across countries were counted as separate listings, each with a separate 
International Standard Book Number. To avoid bias in sampling, I first selected the most recent 
edition of the book, and recorded the lower of the sales ranks (i.e., higher selling) between the 
hard and softcover versions. Doing so ensures that older books are not unfairly disadvantaged in 
achieving a higher sales rank than current textbooks, and higher selling reprint editions are not 
36 
 
excluded from consideration. Because Amazon does not disclose the actual sale number for each 
version of a book, aggregation/averaging of ranks across book versions was not possible.  
Amazon sale ranks have been used in past research as indicator of past sales. Amazon sales ranks 
have been shown to correlate with real sales (Deschâtres & Sornette, 2005); they appear to be 
relatively stable over time (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006). One caveat is that for the very top 
selling books (i.e., books with sales ranks of 10,000 or lower), ranks may change on an hourly 
basis, whereas books with ranks greater than 10,000 are likely to reflect accumulated long term 
sales (Deschâtres & Sornette, 2005). Such instability in ranks are unlikely to affect large portion 
of books in the current sample, with substantial stability observed in one-year test retest of 
Amazon sales ranks (r = .85, p <.001). Moreover, only four sales ranks in 2015 were below 
10,000, and only 3 sales ranks were below 10,000 in 2016. Measures of central tendency showed 
that books in this sample did not achieve really high sales (mean rank in 2015 = 5,102,214; 
median rank in 2016 = 4,722,563). Overall, the ranks showed high stability, indicating little 
change in relative influence over time.  
It should be noted that Amazon sales rankings are one of a few indicators of book sales. Yearly 
industry reports, such as the Library and Book Trade Almanac (e.g., Turock, 2013), provide 
bestselling books of a particular year, but books must sell at least 100,000 copies to make the list. 
Nielsen Bookscan provides point-of-sales data for books, but is costly to obtain (subscription fee 
reported to be one hundred thousand dollars; Kellogg, 2010). The New York Times bestsellers 
list is unlikely to contain books on very specific contexts, such as law enforcement; their 
searchable index extends only from 2008 to present day. Amazon.com represents one of the few 
vendors that provide indicators of book sales for the variety of books sampled in this study. 
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Advice Coding Procedure  
Each book in the sample was coded using the form in Appendix A. Features of the book, such as 
author affiliation, source of expertise (scientist or expert practitioner) were recorded. I also noted 
the means by which the advice was generated (social science or expert opinion), relying on the 
descriptions in the preface, introduction, author’s notes, and initial chapters. If available, I 
attempted to locate the author’s descriptive theory of the social context or negotiation process.  
Since there is no compulsory format for writing books of prescriptive advice, there was no 
standardized section in which all of the advice could always be found. This necessitated a 
stepwise procedure to sample advice, by attempting to select book sections most likely to contain 
advice. I first searched for advice in sections that contained a summary of the book’s contents, 
such as sections titled: “Executive summary: the top ten lessons” in Braun (2013), or “Final 
thoughts” in Pinkley and Northcraft (2003). If no such section(s) existed, I collated advice 
contained in summaries at the end of each chapter. If neither features were present in a particular 
book, I read the book in its entirety for advice, aiming to select actions mentioned in section 
headings, breakout boxes, or bulleted points in the text.  
I classified each piece of advice to a particular negotiation phase with reference to its conduct to 
the first offer and agreement/impasse, as in Study 1. If no such guides were present, I used 
Gulliver’s (1979) inductive theory to guide its classification to a negotiation phase, because it 
was the most detailed in describing behavior belonging to a particular negotiation phase. As with 
Study 1, a single coder produces classifications of unknown reliability and bias. Future 
development of this study will necessitate hiring an independent coder, blind to the hypothesis 
but familiar with Gulliver’s theory, to classify a random subset of the advice to establish 
reliability of the classification of advice.  
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If a book ultimately contained no advice, I selected the next bestselling book until ten books 
were sampled within a social context, or until the list of books was exhausted.  
1.4.6 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample consisted of eight books authored by psychologists, ten marriage counseling 
books, nine law enforcement books4, ten sales books, ten mergers and acquisition books and ten 
legal negotiations books. The full set is listed in Appendix B.  
Table 1 shows the total advice counts, as well as the means, and standard deviation of the 
percentage of advice devoted to each negotiation phase in the social contexts sampled. Figure 3 
displays the distributions of the advice using boxplots.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 2 posited that organizational researchers would make greater numbers of 
prescriptions about the bargaining stage compared to experts in social contexts. This hypothesis 
was supported. I regressed the percentage of the advice in the bargaining phase of negotiation on 
dummy variables that represented the social contexts from which the advice originated. I then 
compared the organizational researcher dummy to dummies comparing each of the social 
contexts sampled. The mean percentage of bargaining advice in the social psychology books was 
higher than those from mergers and acquisitions (t = 5.30, p < .001), marriage counseling (t 
=3.40, p < .001), law enforcement (t = 2.77, p < .01), sales (t = 2.62, p = .01), and legal 
negotiations books (t = 2.96, p < .01). 
 
                                                 
4 The list of books containing advice was exhausted after 9 books. 
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Table 1. Advice Counts and Percentage of Advice in Pre-Bargaining, Bargaining, and Post-
Bargaining Phases across Social Contexts. 
 
 
 
Note. Percentage of advice were first calculated within books, then averaged across books.  
 
As secondary analyses, I compared the mean percentage of advice in pre-bargaining phases 
across the social contexts. In comparing advice in social psychology books to other social 
contexts, mean level of advice in social psychology books were not significantly different to 
those in mergers and acquisitions (t = .41, p = .68), law enforcement (t = -1.76, p = .08), or sales 
(t = -1.44, p = .16). But social psychology books contained less advice about the pre-bargaining 
phase compared to books on marriage counseling (t = -2.73, p = .01), or legal negotiations (t = -
2.30, p = .03). 
Analysis conducted on the post-bargaining advice reveals that mergers and acquisitions books 
contained more advice about the post-bargaining phase than social psychology (t = -5.97, p < 
.001). But the percentage of post-bargaining advice in organizational researcher books were not 
different to those found in marriage counseling (t = .02, p = .99), law enforcement (t = 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Advice Applicable to Negotiation Phases across Sources of Prescriptive Theory. 
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-.58, p = .56), sales (t = -.84, p = .41), and legal negotiations (t = -.09, p = .93).  
1.4.7 Discussion 
Analyses reveal a concentration of prescriptions for the bargaining phase in the prescriptive 
theories of organizational researchers. These results complement the pattern observed in Study 1. 
Empirical research conducted by organizational researchers concentrates on the bargaining phase 
with limited explanation or exploration of in the other phases. These results further reinforce the 
claims made by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) that negotiation theory yields little insight about the 
pre- and the post- bargaining phases of negotiation.  
There were notable differences in the distribution of advice across sources. With the exception of 
mergers and acquisition and organizational researcher sources, more than 50% of the advice in 
negotiation texts pertained to the pre-bargaining phase. Proportions of pre-bargaining phase 
advice were significantly higher in legal negotiation and marriage counseling theories compared 
to the organizational researcher theories. These differences potentially reflect the underlying 
nature of the negotiation processes – both legal negotiations and marriage counseling can arise as 
a result of dispute between parties, with parties potentially reflecting the extensive preparation 
required to research the nature of the dispute, and also to repair relationships to the point where 
bargaining is a feasible exercise. For example, pre-bargaining advice in the marriage counseling 
context pertained to building rapport between partners. Gottman and Silver (1994) recommend 
“Ask your spouse what he or she is feeling and then sit back and listen non-defensively for a 
while.” (p. 222). Without a working relationship in which parties can make arrangements for  
joint outcome, a third-party intervention, such as mediation, becomes necessary (Love & 
Stulberg, 2006).  
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In contrast, prescriptions about relationship building processes prior to bargaining was rare 
among books authored by organizational researchers. Instead, much of the pre-bargaining advice 
focused on obtaining information about the bargaining constraints, such as one’s goals, learning 
about the counterpart’s preferences, and developing a strong alternative to negotiated agreement. 
The difference in the types of prescriptions may be due to assumptions made in the methodology 
employed by organizational researchers. Studies that use experimental methods, especially those 
that utilize a variant of the multi-issue payoff chart developed by Pruitt and Lewis (1975), often 
require simplifying assumptions. Key among them is a lack of interaction between parties before 
bargaining occurs. Without such a history, one can assume the state of relations are neutral, or 
dependent upon the emotional state/expectations of the each participant. In contrast, parties who 
experience conflict to the point where they require counseling may need to harmonize relations 
before contemplating further efforts to define their pattern of interdependence with each other. In 
law enforcement contexts, there may be little or no rapport between an officer attempting to 
enforce the law and a person alleged to have broken it. Rapport building could be central in such 
negotiations, as it may prevent reneging on terms of the deal (Misino, 2004). Future extensions 
of this work that examines the nature of the advice given will further illuminate qualitative 
differences in the type of advice. That will enhance understanding of the nature of effective 
behaviors in these contexts. 
Prescriptive theories of mergers and acquisitions focused on the post-bargaining phase. Worth 
noting is that some of the most influential books on mergers and acquisitions were about the 
post-merger integration process (e.g., After the Merger: Managing the Shockwaves, Mergers & 
Acquisitions Integration Handbook: Helping Companies Realize The Full Value of Acquisitions), 
highlighting the importance of the post-bargaining process. A commonly cited reason for lack of 
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post-merger/acquisition organization performance is the failure to successfully manage human 
resources following the merger or acquisition agreement (Buono & Bowditch, 2003). That is, 
much of the projected value in joining two or more organizations can be compromised by the 
failure to successfully integrate the hierarchies, management philosophies, work practices, 
resources, and organizational cultures. This demonstrates not only the fragility of the perceived 
value represented in agreements, but the substantial efforts required to successfully implement 
agreements. The need to successfully navigate the post-bargaining phase of the agreement is 
further heightened by the significant value represented in the deals of this nature. In 2004,  
30,000 merger and acquisitions were struck globally, collectively worth $1,900 billion 
(Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006).  
Overall, the pattern of prescriptions about negotiation phases suggest that theories of negotiation 
informed by empirical research and authored by organizational researchers reflects research 
practices. Although I do not have a formal way to establish a concrete link between the 
organizational researcher author books sampled to empirical research, such books typically 
contain citations, references, or appendices that list academic studies. The reliance on those 
empirical research studies have produced a pattern of prescriptions that diverge significantly 
from theories derived by experts in social contexts in which negotiation effectiveness is a 
necessity. Moreover, examining the distribution of prescriptions across social contexts indicates 
significant variability in the distribution of proportions of advice across phases. Prescriptions 
about mergers and acquisitions does not resemble the distribution of prescriptions seen in legal 
negotiations, nor in law enforcement contexts. So although it is suggested by some 
organizational researchers that many negotiations feature similar characteristics and a single set 
of behaviors should be effective across contexts (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Lewicki & Litterer, 
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1985), some negotiations may place greater or less emphasis on a particular phase. That implies 
that negotiators in different social contexts may require competency with distinct sets of 
behaviors to be effective.  
Organizational scholars have aimed to create theories of negotiation that can apply across social 
contexts. But examining the patterns of prescriptions reveals that their prescriptive theories 
reflect research practices, not necessarily how negotiation is practiced in any given field context. 
Behaviors in the bargaining phase of negotiations were emphasized in their theories, while most 
domain specific theories of negotiation described by practitioners emphasized behaviors in the 
pre-bargaining phase. Mergers and acquisition theories emphasized behaviors in the post-
bargaining phase. There were also some indications of qualitative differences in the type of 
prescriptions given. Organizational scholarship generated theories emphasized behaviors 
pertaining to the issues/economic outcomes. Other theories emphasized the relational aspects of 
negotiation.  
1.5 General Discussion 
Negotiation effectiveness is required to be effective in many social contexts, particularly those 
that require joint decision making or group coordination. It is a pervasive process that shapes 
how we form relationships, facilitate exchange with others, resolve disputes, and plan for the 
future. Given an enduring need to negotiate well, observers, expert practitioners, and social 
scientists have applied their efforts into understanding the phenomenon and providing advice to 
others.  
Gulliver (1979) derived a universal theory of the negotiation process using inductive theory, 
derived from contextually diverse case studies involving land disputes among the Arusha people, 
and disputes among the Process Workers of America (union) and the Industrial Processing 
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Company (management). Gulliver used the commonalities in the dispute resolution process 
between the two cases to derive a universal theory consisting of an ordered sequence of activities 
across time. The theory outlines the substantive first offer and agreement as key transition points 
during a dispute. Theories based on observational methods in the international relations (Zartman 
& Berman, 1983) and legal contexts (Williams, 1985) – particularistic theories of negotiation 
generated from specific social contexts provide converging support for a three phase model of 
negotiation, with substantive first offers and agreements serving as transition points.  
Organizational scholars have also sought to produce theories of negotiation that could be 
universal in nature, or at least have aimed to produce universal theories. But systematic 
examination of this program of research has revealed striking similarities in the research methods 
used, and the phase of negotiation investigated – a monoculture of experimental research 
focusing on the bargaining phase of negotiations. Narrative reviews of this research have pointed 
out the potential limitations of this shared similarity. Carnevale and Pruitt (1993) claimed such a 
program would produce limited insights into the pre- and post- bargaining phases of negotiation. 
Along similar lines, Barley (1991) and Greenhalgh and Neslin (1995) have posited that 
bracketing organizational research to focus on the bargaining phase limits its potential to 
generalize to the understanding of negotiations that occur as part of ongoing relationships. The 
narrative reviews suggest that theories of negotiation that arise from this program is limited in its 
generality. The contribution of Study 1 was not only to empirically test the propositions 
embedded in those narrative reviews, but also to highlight the extent to which organizational 
researchers may have focused their efforts in studying negotiations through a stylistic lens.  
The very widespread practice of using experimental methods that operationally define 
negotiations as a bargaining would task appear to have shaped and constrained psychological 
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theories of negotiation. Exclusive reliance on such methods may have re-cast organizational 
researchers’ complete understanding of the wider phenomenon. For example, two theories of 
individual differences in negotiation do not conceptualize how individuals act outside the bounds 
of bargaining. In the theory of individual differences in conflict handling (Kilmann & Thomas, 
1977; Ruble & Thomas, 1976), the way in which people approach conflicts in their life is 
thought to be represented by the extent to which they engage in cooperative and assertive 
behavior. Missing from this theory is how and why people enter into conflicts in the first place, 
or their behavior towards the counterpart if and when the conflict is resolved – crucially 
important background information for those involved in land disputes, pay disputes, legal 
disputes, and international relations disputes. Similarly, theories of social value orientation 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968), suggest people have a preference about how value should be 
divided between the self and the other. But missing from this theory is who the counterpart might 
be, or more precisely, how friendly or contentious their counterpart is as a result of prior 
relations.  
In general, the reliance on any one method produces a truncated, and potentially skewed view of 
the phenomenon, with experimental research producing results particular to the sample and 
procedures deployed (McGrath, 1981). Such methods are thought to produce results with limited 
generality over actors and contexts (McGrath, 1981). Despite this feature of the dominant 
research paradigm, organizational scholars explicitly seek to articulate widely generalizable 
theory. When indicators of prescriptive theories of organizational researchers and experts in 
social contexts were compared, significant differences emerged. Reflecting the research 
emphasis on the bargaining phase of negotiations, much of the prescriptive theory actually 
articulated by organizational scholars focused on the bargaining phase. The contribution of Study 
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2 was to highlight how dominant research practices can generate prescriptive theorizing 
decoupled from the actual practice of the activities it claims to assist.  
Raiffa’s (1982) call for research-based prescriptions to negotiate effectively did not express a 
novel sentiment. Expert negotiators for centuries have recognized the need to disseminate best 
practices in social contexts that require negotiation ability. The response to Raiffa’s call – a large 
and growing body of empirical research – has indeed produced numerous and useful findings. 
But few have yet questioned the implications of using research paradigms that model only a 
restricted segment of the negotiation process. Until organizational scholars redress this balance 
by deploying more diverse methodologies suitable for studying pre- and post- bargaining phases 
of negotiation, a comprehensive theory of negotiation will remain an aspiration.  
Further development of the social science of negotiation depends on theorizing about and 
measuring the three phases of negotiation. Indeed, one of the plausible reasons for the lack of 
attention paid to the pre- and post- bargaining phases could be driven by a lack of theoretical 
impetus, namely that current theory does not emphasize a need to measure those phases. A 
complementary reason could be that there are no methodological tools that can be deployed to 
measure behavior in those phases. Without such tools, organizational researchers face the 
challenging task of creating novel means to measure behavior in those phases. Creating a 
comprehensive theory of negotiation, and a suite of measurement tools to capture those phases 
are beyond the scope of a single research paper. But an initial step to develop theory and 
measurement tools that look outside the bargaining phase is outlined in Chapter 2.   
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Chapter 2: Effective at Every Phase: The 
Impact of Conscientiousness in the 
Negotiation Process 
 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that the program of empirical research on negotiation has left the pre- 
and post- bargaining phases of negotiation largely unexamined. To facilitate the development of 
a comprehensive, social scientific theory of negotiation, theories and measurement tools that 
address those phases are required. Chapter 2 aims to make an initial impression towards this 
goal. Toward the aim of generating a new individual differences theory of negotiation 
effectiveness, I posit and provide support for the role of conscientiousness in predicting effective 
behavior across the three phases and negotiation outcomes in Studies 3, 4, and 5. Toward the aim 
of developing measurement tools, Study 4 outlines the initial development of a theory-based 
survey instrument designed to measure effective behaviors across the three phases.   
2.1 The Role of Individual Differences in Negotiations 
The ability to negotiate is central to many organizational contexts. Thus, ability to identify those 
who are more or less able to negotiate has important implications for both selection and training 
within organizations. To this end, the growing literature on the individual differences antecedents 
of negotiation effectiveness has produced key findings, such as the positive correlation between 
cognitive ability and negotiation effectiveness (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Sharma, Bottom, & 
Elfenbein, 2013). In this body of work, a large number of traits and characteristics have been 
studied, ranging from background characteristics such as gender and culture, to attitudes such as 
negotiations self-efficacy, to traits such as the Big Five personality factors, to beliefs such as 
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ethical appropriateness. The aim of this chapter is to examine the association between individual 
differences, with particular focus on conscientiousness, and effective negotiation behaviors and 
negotiation outcomes.   
Research on individual differences implicate conscientiousness as a correlate of achievement 
across multiple social domains. By logical extension, it should be a predictor of negotiation 
effectiveness. Being conscientiousness – the degree to which a person is predisposed to act in 
organized and diligent ways (Costa & McCrae, 1992) – correlates with achievement across a 
variety of social contexts. Conscientiousness is positively associated with desirable workplace 
outcomes, such as individual (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Mount, Barrick, & Stewart, 1998), and 
team performance (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998; English, Griffith, & Steelman, 
2004). It also correlates positively with outcomes in other domains of life that require substantial 
planning and execution skills including academic and health outcomes (Borghans, Duckworth, 
Heckman, & Ter Weel, 2008; Molloy, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2013), and asset accumulation 
(Letkiewicz & Fox, 2014). In addition, conscientiousness is correlates with preparation 
behaviors, such as career (Rogers & Creed, 2008) and financial planning (Letkiewicz & Fox, 
2014).  
In the negotiation context, being thorough and achievement oriented implies extensive 
preparations, such as researching one’s own needs, the counterpart’s needs, contemplating 
alternatives to negotiated agreement, and the context in which negotiations take place. During 
the bargaining process, conscientiousness could be correlated with behaviors such as tracking the 
sequence of offers as they take place, and comparing received offers/proposals against 
aspirations. At the conclusion of bargaining, conscientious individuals could be expected to work 
more diligently to implement the negotiation, as well as to review the negotiation to check if 
50 
 
goals were satisfied, and to seek feedback about the process. The predisposition to behave in 
diligent and achievement directed ways should be an antecedent to these behaviors. 
Despite the logically expected positive correlation, no consistent empirical relationship has been 
found. A large-scale meta-analysis that examined the correlation between individual differences 
and negotiation outcomes found the average correlation between conscientiousness and a range 
of individual outcomes (e.g., economic outcomes, social-psychological outcomes) to be near 
zero, and not significant (Sharma et al., 2013). Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn from 
Sharma, Bottom, and Elfenbein’s (2013) analysis is a paradoxical one: that highly conscientious 
individuals would not make more effective negotiators than their non-conscientious counterparts. 
But examining the studies included in the meta-analysis revealed a pattern previously observed 
in Chapter 1, and a potential clue to the reasons for the non-association. All of the studies I was 
able to examine (i.e., published articles) involved the use of an experimental paradigm either 
featuring a multi-issue payoff chart, or a distributive simulation with one issue (Barry & 
Friedman, 1998; Dimotakis, Conlon, & Ilies, 2012; Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & 
Baccaro, 2008; Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007; Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004). I 
argue that rather than being authoritative tests of the theory that conscientiousness should be 
related to negotiation effectiveness, results from these prior studies may have made 
methodological tradeoffs that obscure the observation of a genuine association. Commonly 
deployed research designs may be sampling a limited aspect of the full negotiation process, 
yielding a distorted picture of the general determinants of effective practice.  
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2.1.1 Limitations of negotiation simulations in revealing individual differences 
influences   
Simulation methods may constrict the observation of the conscientiousness-negotiation 
effectiveness relationship. Simulations have proved to be a popular method study of studying 
negotiations (Pruitt, 2012). One potential reason for their popularity may be that real negotiations 
can extend for months, if not years (James, 2011; Zartman & Berman, 1983), and can potentially 
involve a changing set of parties, making their study difficult. But simulations that can be run in 
laboratory or classroom settings can truncate that process to hours, if not minutes, while 
restricting the number and set of parties involved. This saving in time typically is realized in a 
manner that also greatly compresses and simplifies the preparation phase. They also do not 
model aspects of negotiation that would be influenced by conscientiousness. 
Simulations typically define a bargaining context, by specifying the number and role of 
participants, and the set of information relevant to the bargaining process. Moreover, a necessary 
methodological choice is to quiz the participants in the simulation about the information in the 
simulation briefings, such that all parties with the same role have parity in information. Parity in 
information about the simulation ensures comparability in responses within a particular role, 
which reduces noise attributable to confusion about experimental roles. In such simulations, 
highly conscientious individuals cannot prepare for the negotiation to any greater extent than less 
conscientious individuals (Sharma et al., 2013). However, the investment in time and effort 
associated with the preparation process is one of the aspects of negotiation most likely influenced 
by predispositions to be diligent and achievement seeking. Empirical research and practical 
negotiation wisdom point to the idea that having more accurate and pertinent information to the 
negotiation serves to benefit the party that holds it, and contributes to effectiveness as a 
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negotiator (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Zartman & Berman, 1983). Moreover, preparation is not a 
small nor inconsequential aspect of the overall negotiation process. Despite the stereotype that 
negotiation begins when the first offer is made, and ends when an agreement is struck, 
experienced negotiators may spend much of their time – up to 75 percent in the case of diplomats 
– in preparation for the bargaining process (Zartman, 2006). Equalizing the information held by 
parties enables precise tests of the impact of other variables but obscures the relevance of 
important preparation behaviors that conscientious people may engage in to a greater extent than 
less conscientious people.  
2.1.2 An alternative conceptualization of negotiation effectiveness 
A related limitation is that negotiation effectiveness is often measured by examining the value of 
agreements in simulations. In the briefing materials provided to participants, participants are 
typically provided with a payoff matrix, or a list of outcomes that matches a point value to each 
discrete gradient of issue with a small finite number of these gradients (Pruitt, 2012). 
Alternatively, they may be assigned to buyer and seller roles that implicitly assume higher 
performance for buyers (sellers) who negotiate a lower (higher) price. Negotiation effectiveness 
is taken to be the value of the agreement reached by the parties. Other variables measured once 
the agreement is reached, such as one’s own, or counterpart’s satisfaction from the negotiation 
may also be treated as effectiveness metrics.  
This approach assumes that the value of negotiated agreements, and people’s perceptions of their 
agreements are the proper metrics by which negotiators should be evaluated. This may be an 
incomplete view of negotiation effectiveness. Although agreements are an important milestone in 
the negotiation process, the value of agreements (or impasses) may not comprehensively capture 
a negotiator’s abilities. A negotiated agreement represents a promise to be fulfilled by future 
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actions, such as an exchange of goods or services for money, mutual exchange of favors, or an 
open-ended commitment to an interdependent relationship. In implementing these promises, 
counterparts may under-deliver on such promises, or a focal negotiator may over-deliver on their 
promises. Thus, actions to ensure implementation of the agreed upon terms can be just as 
important as the agreement itself (Mislin et al., 2011). Negotiators can also engage in learning 
processes after the completion of the process, by reviewing and seeking feedback about the 
negotiation process just experienced, facilitating their progress in becoming a better negotiator in 
the future. And as previously mentioned, negotiators can also further effective practice even 
before the negotiation begins, by preparing well for the bargaining process.  
Negotiation effectiveness is not only reflected in the negotiated agreements or the exchange that 
occurs during the implementation process. Negotiation effectiveness is reflected also in the 
extent to which individuals engage in behaviors associated with a higher probability of more 
favorable outcomes generated through the wider stream of social exchange between the parties. 
Instead of relying solely on the value of agreements as the index of negotiator effectiveness, I 
conceptualize the best negotiators as those who enact actions that maximize the probability of 
favorable outcomes across the long-term spectrum of bargaining, which include not only 
reaching favorable outcomes, but the quality of relationships between parties during and 
following implementation (Curhan et al., 2006; Sharma, 2015). Negotiating parties often engage 
in repeated exchange, with social capital built in prior exchanges used to inform future actions 
(Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O Brien, 2006).  
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A more general way of stating this idea is to propose that understanding the wide range of 
behaviors is central to negotiation effectiveness. These include actions as widely varying as 
researching the counterpart’s preferences, making a favorable first offer, or creating an 
implementation plan, which all feed into outcomes. I expect the effectiveness of negotiation 
behaviors to vary, such that some behaviors will be more effective than others in maximizing a 
particular outcome. As an example, making a first offer near one’s own reservation level should 
usually be less effective in securing greater levels of value with respect to the issues being 
negotiated, as compared to making a first offer that is vastly preferable compared to one’s 
reservation level. The likelihood of engaging in any behavior should be influenced by a range of 
factors, including individual differences. Differences such as personality traits are 
predispositions to enact certain behaviors over others (Fleeson, 2004). In addition, situational 
factors idiosyncratic to a particular negotiation (e.g., time pressure), or contextual factors (e.g., 
social norms, culture, precedents) could also influence which behaviors negotiators enact.  
2.1.3 Conscientiousness as Antecedent to Effective Behaviors 
The observed absence of correlation between conscientiousness and negotiation outcomes in 
previous studies may reflect considerable similarity in methodological design choices across the 
empirical studies. If these choices limited variance in relevant negotiation behaviors most 
associated with conscientiousness then the absence of observed correlations may be misleading. 
In particular, similar methodological choices that concentrates measurement on the bargaining 
phase of negotiation would not detect the influence of conscientiousness in the phases of 
negotiation where they are most likely to be apparent – the pre- and post- bargaining phases. A 
diligent and detail oriented behavioral disposition should be most apparent in behavior related to 
planning, research, and follow through. Such behaviors increase the probability of favorable 
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outcomes flowing from a negotiated agreement, but are rarely modeled in the experimental 
simulations most often deployed.  
2.1.4 Overview of Studies 
Studying the role of conscientiousness requires taking a novel approach, which combines 
qualitative and quantitative methods and draws from the perspectives of experts in negotiation 
and personality theory while also including conventional research participants. In the first two 
studies, I sample effective behaviors from sources that contain advice – i.e., prescriptive theories 
of negotiation effectiveness – to derive theoretical and empirical correlations between 
conscientiousness and effectiveness. Study 3 establishes theoretical associations between 
conscientiousness and effective negotiation behaviors by recruiting individual differences 
experts to rate the extent to which the Big Five factors should correlate with particular 
negotiation behaviors. In Study 4, I describe the development of the Negotiation Behavior 
Inventory (NBI), a theory-based measure of effective negotiation behaviors. I administered the 
measure to a large online sample, report its basic psychometric properties, and its empirical 
association with the Big Five factors. In Study 5, I test the correlation between conscientiousness 
and negotiation effectiveness in a complex simulation likely to favor parties who prepare well.  
2.2 Study 3 – Implicit Theories of Negotiation Behaviors and 
Effectiveness 
The aim of Study 3 is to examine the theoretical association between conscientiousness and 
effective negotiation behaviors. While I posit that much prior research is suggestive of a positive 
association, these are assertions based primarily on past research on organizational and 
individual differences psychology, streams of research that have not directly investigated 
individual differences in negotiations. If one were to examine the prior research by negotiation 
56 
 
scholars, it would show considerable evidence to suggest a non-correlation. But those studies 
share methodological similarities that may limit the generalizability of the results obtained within 
them.  
The first step toward creating a generalizable theory of individual differences influences on 
negotiation effectiveness requires using methodologies with characteristics that are more suited 
to generalizing over actors and over contexts. McGrath (1981) notes that no single study would 
have all of those characteristics. Formal theory maximizes the ability to generalize over actors, 
but because there is no empirical basis for the method, there is no concept of measurement 
precision. In addition, because there is are no specific features of a social context to model in 
formal theory, the ability to generalize to specific contexts are limited. In contrast, field studies 
maximize the ability to generalize to specific contexts, by sampling from real settings. But they 
lack precision, attributable to the lack of control over research process. Field studies also lack 
generality over actors because of the limited ability to sample diverse populations in any given 
social context.  
I propose a hybrid approach that contain elements of theory building and field research in order 
to support a generalizable individual differences theory of negotiation behavior. Hybrid 
approaches do not ameliorate the limitations of the constituent methods. But a combination of 
formal theory and field study methods provide a starting point from which generalizable theories 
can be entertained. The hybrid method I propose consists of two steps. I first plan to draw from 
elements of field research, by sampling negotiation behaviors thought to be effective across a 
variety of contexts. Such behaviors are the products of efforts to understand effectiveness in the 
field, and speak to the range of possible effective behaviors during negotiation. The second step 
consists of drawing from elements of formal theory, by recruiting individual differences experts 
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to derive point estimates of the relationship between each negotiation behavior and a limited 
range of individual differences, namely the Big Five factors as well as the facets of the each 
factor. Facets capture more specific aspects of the dispositions represented factors, in that they 
represent different manifestations of a factor (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). For example, high 
levels of conscientiousness could be indicated by both propensity to avoid taking risks (i.e., high 
levels of the cautiousness facet), or the propensity for diligent work (i.e., high levels of 
achievement striving). Understanding the theorized associations between facet level constructs of 
the Big Five with respect to effective behaviors could yield more detailed insight as to what 
aspects of a factor could drive the association.  
This hybrid method aims to facilitate a general theory of individual differences by addressing a 
key limitation of the experimental research on negotiations – that to a large extent only examines 
the subset of behavior allowable within the bounds of a simulation designed or employed by the 
researcher. Moreover, by recruiting experts to provide point estimates of the association between 
behavior and individual differences constructs, I aim to generate an individual differences theory 
not specific to a select sample of actors, but generalizable across actors.  
2.2.1 Method 
Prescriptive theory sampling procedure  
I sampled prescriptive theories of negotiation in texts about negotiation, as well as those from a 
wide range of social contexts that require negotiation: international relations, legal, sales, 
mergers and acquisitions, marriage counseling, and law enforcement. Although many outlets for 
prescriptive theories exist, I targeted published book length texts, because they are likely to be 
authored by experts and social scientists alike, are available for examination because of its highly 
58 
 
codified nature, and are written in the extended fashion that yields clear recommendations. 
Twenty-six texts in total were sampled, with the full list shown in Appendix C.  
For each book, I searched for sections that explicitly listed advice, such as in summary chapters, 
or in summary sections at the end of chapters, as in Study 2. If no such section existed, I read the 
book in its entirety to search for prescriptions. 232 pieces of advice were sampled. These 
behaviors were screened for clarity or double barreled language, by exposing them to graduate 
students and research assistants (N = 6). Ambiguous advice was removed and double barreled 
advice was transformed to separate items, leaving 205 distinct behaviors. The behaviors covered 
a wide range of actions one could engage in during the negotiation process. Behaviors ranged 
from efforts to prepare for the negotiation, actions during the bargaining process, and those 
taking place after negotiated agreements. These behaviors broadly conform to a three phase 
structure of negotiation composed of pre-bargaining, bargaining, and post-bargaining phases. 
Marking the transitions between these phases are key events that change the nature of the 
interaction between parties: the first substantive offer and agreements (Gulliver, 1979; Williams, 
1985; Zartman & Berman, 1983). Prior to the first substantive offer, parties may spend relatively 
little time in direct contact with the counterpart. Namely, they may spend time preparing for a 
negotiation, such as generating and learning about a list of sales prospects, or spend time 
convincing the counterpart that negotiation is necessary to resolve a dispute or realize an 
opportunity. Following the first substantive offer, parties may engage in an interactive process 
where alternative proposals are discussed. Following the conclusion of bargaining, the parties 
engage in less problem solving, but engage in behaviors to implement the terms reached.  
I used theories by Gulliver (1979), Williams (1985), and Zartman and Berman (1983) to guide 
the categorization of each behavior to a phase, as described in Study 1. Being generated from 
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prescriptive theories, the behaviors sampled represent face valid actions that negotiation experts 
believe will increase the probability of obtaining and securing favorable negotiation outcomes. 
Examples are given in Table 2.  
Expert rating procedure 
I presented the 205 behaviors to individual difference experts (N = 9). The criteria for selecting 
experts depended on their experience with individual differences constructs. I purposefully 
limited the search to PhD level students of psychology who successfully completed graduate 
level coursework on individual differences, have experience in conducting individual differences 
research, and familiar with the Big Five constructs. The initial call for experts was circulated by 
Dr. Hillary Anger Elfenbein, who emailed researchers in individual differences laboratories. The 
email advertised paid employment for PhD level students who would code stimulus items for an 
individual differences research study. Total time commitment was advertised as approximately 
20 hours. The experts recruited had considerable experience in conducting individual differences 
research. At the time of their providing ratings, they had collectively published 28 papers in peer 
reviewed journals, most directly related to the topic of individual differences. Experts were 
compensated at a rate of $25 dollars an hour for completing the rating task.  
Before providing them with a list of behaviors to evaluate, experts were provided with 
instructive readings about the negotiation process: six introductory chapters and papers on 
negotiation (Appendix D) that explained key concepts including distributive and integrative 
bargaining, and negotiation behaviors in the pre-bargaining, bargaining, and post-bargaining 
phases. After completing the readings, each expert was given a link to a web survey which listed 
the behaviors along with a rating scale for each behavior (list of behaviors and details in 
Appendix E). Behaviors were presented one at a time, and the sets of behaviors were arranged 
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such that they mirrored the sequential three-phase structure, with behaviors in the pre-bargaining 
phase presented first, and behaviors in the post-bargaining phase presented last. This ensured 
experts were not switching between frames of reference, and potentially introducing noise into 
the ratings as a result.  
For each behavior presented, experts rated the extent to which a given behavior should be 
associated with each of the Big Five factors (0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high). Thus, 
each behavior obtained five scores from each expert, one for its theoretical correlation with 
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. If an 
expert rated a behavior as being a manifestation of a personality factor (i.e., provided a rating of 
“low” or greater), I additionally asked which facet of that factor would be associated to the 
behavior, on the same 4 point scale. Facet labels from the International Personality Item Pool 
(Goldberg et al., 2006) were used (listed in Appendix F). Any facet that did not receive a score 
due to it not being displayed to the expert (i.e., facets of factors rated to have no association with 
the behavior) were coded as receiving a rating of zero.  
2.2.2 Results  
Interrater Agreement 
The appropriate interrater reliability model was an intraclass correlation (ICC) using a two-way 
mixed, consistency, average-measures design. Each expert rated all of the behaviors, and I 
assumed the experts were drawn a random population. The average score of the experts were the 
unit of analyses, so their reliability was the metric of interest. Separate ICCs were calculated for 
each of the Big Five factors. Moderate to high levels of consistency were observed for all factors, 
according to guidelines cited by Hallgren (2012), who indicated fair agreement for ICC values 
61 
 
.40 or higher: openness (ICC(2, K) = .72), conscientiousness (ICC(2, K) = .68), extraversion (ICC(2, 
K) = .73), agreeableness (ICC(2, K) = .83), and neuroticism (ICC(2, K) = .53).  
Theory Driven Correlations between the Big Five and Negotiation Behaviors 
Given observed consistency, I averaged ratings across judges to form a single theoretical 
correlation between each of the Big Five factors and negotiation behaviors within each phase. 
Dimension reduction via factor analysis was not possible, given the high number of items (205) 
and the low number of judges (N = 9). 
To test the hypothesis that conscientiousness would be associated with negotiation effectiveness, 
I estimated a series of regression models. Results are shown in Table 3, and displayed 
graphically in Figure 4. Unstandardized coefficients are shown, which reflect the mean ratings 
on a 0-3 scale. At every phase, conscientiousness proved to be a stronger correlate of effective 
behaviors than the average of the other factors. Planned contrasts showed the coefficient for 
conscientiousness to be larger than the average of the coefficients of the remaining four factors at 
the pre-bargaining phase [t = 26.58, p < 10-15], bargaining phase [t = 11.59, p < 10-15], and at the 
post-bargaining phase [t = 9.96, p < 10-15]. Similar results were obtained when conscientiousness 
was compared to each of the other Big Five factors using a post-hoc contrast test procedure 
(Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference tests; Tukey HSD). Tukey HSD procedures control for 
experiment-wise type I error rate, and thus is a suitable method for assessing significance when 
performing multiple comparisons (Abdi & Williams, 2010). In every phase, conscientiousness 
received ratings that were significantly higher than each of the other personality factors.
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Table 2. Behaviors Sampled from Books Containing Prescriptive Theories of Negotiations. 
 
Note. Types of behaviors are listed in bold, with examples of each type listed below each type.  
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Figure 4. Expert Generated Associations between Big Five Factors and Negotiation Behaviors. 
 
Note. C = Conscientiousness, O = Openness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, N = Neuroticism. The elevation of each letter 
represents the average theorized strength of association between a Big Five factor and effective behavior in that phase.. 
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Table 3. Theoretical Associations between Big Five Factors and Effective Negotiation 
Behaviors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The dependent variable was the average rating each behavior received from the individual 
differences experts. Independent variables represent factor labels. The first column for each phase 
(labeled ‘B’) report unstandardized coefficients from no-intercept regression models. The five factors 
were treated as a categorical variable, thus unstandardized coefficients reported above indicate the 
mean ratings indicated by experts. Ratings reflect theorized strength of correlation between a big five 
factor and negotiation behavior within a phase (0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high). The 
second column for each phase (labeled ‘Beta’) report standardized regression coefficients from no-
intercept regression models. Each Big Five factor label was treated as a dummy variable. No 
coefficients are available for neuroticism due to collinearity with other dummy variables. † p < .10, * 
p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
To further examine the role of conscientiousness on negotiation behaviors, I examined the 
theoretical association between conscientiousness facets and negotiation behaviors across phases.  
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Table 4. Theoretical Associations between Conscientiousness Facets and Negotiation Behaviors  
 
Note. No-intercept regression models reported. Unstandardized coefficients reported above indicate 
the mean ratings indicated by experts. Ratings reflect theorized strength of correlation between a 
conscientiousness facet and negotiation behavior within a phase (0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = 
high). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
Results are shown in Table 4. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. The means do not 
indicate that any one facet of conscientiousness should be more strongly associated with 
effective behaviors. This is supported by Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference contrasts 
which show that no two pairs of conscientiousness facets received ratings significantly different 
from each other. Table of means and results of comparisons for the facets of other factors are 
reported in Appendix G. 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Using a novel hybrid method that incorporated elements of field studies and formal theory, I 
attempted to generate data that could be used as a basis for creating theory based on the 
relationship between individual differences and negotiation effectiveness. The procedures, which 
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aimed to produce a guide for the expectation about the role of the Big Five in predicting 
negotiation effectiveness, sampled behavior not typically explicitly modeled in empirical studies 
of negotiation, in particular those that occur before the first offer and after the agreement or 
impasse.  
Far from a non-association, conscientiousness was evaluated by individual difference experts to 
be a predictor of negotiation effectiveness in every phase of negotiation. This pattern is 
consistent with studies of organizational and individual differences psychology that show 
conscientiousness to positively correlate with achievement across many social contexts (Barrick 
& Mount, 1991; Borghans et al., 2008). It is inconsistent with prior findings in organizational 
scholarship that finds a non-association between conscientiousness and negotiation outcomes. 
The disparity in conclusions could be attributed to the methodologies used. In studying the 
process within the confines of a simulation within which people have little opportunity to express 
individual differences, organizational researchers may have unwittingly made methodological 
tradeoffs that make it difficult to observe the true correlation between individual differences and 
outcomes. Moreover, a notable pattern in the data was that the theoretical association was lowest 
for the bargaining stage – the stage most consistently studied by organizational researchers. The 
influence of conscientiousness is most likely to be apparent before the first offer is made, and 
after parties reach agreement or impasse.  
The contribution of this study is that it contributes to a universal theory of individual differences 
in negotiation behaviors across multiple phases of negotiation, and personality factors. Prior to 
this research, organizational researchers relied almost purely on empirical results – Sharma and 
colleague’s (2013) meta-analysis for example – to guide their expectations about the role of 
individual differences in negotiation effectiveness. But similarities in the methodologies used in 
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those empirical studies, which represents a near perfect confound across methods and non-
associations. When methods and effects are confounded, the true pattern of results may not be 
represented in the observed data (Roberts, MacCann, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2010). By using 
alternative methodologies that deliberately aim to sample and account for a wide variety of 
effective behaviors, this study shows much promise for the role of individual differences beyond 
the narrow bracket of simulation studies.  
By widening the scope of negotiation effectiveness to include a wide range of effective 
behaviors, I present a theory-driven argument for the predictive role of conscientiousness across 
negotiation phases. But a limitation of these data are that they are driven entirely by the implicit 
theories of individual difference experts. I conducted Study 4 to develop a methodology that 
could serve to facilitate measuring correlations between the constructs using other methods.  
 
2.3 Study 4 – Development of the Negotiation Behavior 
Inventory (NBI) 
The results of the studies in Chapter 1 demonstrate a monoculture of experimental research that 
focused measurement on the bargaining phase of negotiation. Many important insights have been 
gained by using the experimental method to study the bargaining process. But pre- and post- 
bargaining phases remain virtually unmeasured. The lack of methodological tools limit potential 
for empirical investigations of behavior in those phases, and also by implication, the creation of 
evidence based theory to guide negotiators in those phases. Advances in understanding the 
extended negotiation process cannot be achieved until we develop flexible tools investigators can 
readily deploy across multiple contexts. Some extant experimental methods are designed to 
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measure behavior across multiple phases (c.f. Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 
2006; Mislin et al., 2011), but they require extensive laboratory preparation and elaborate 
computer interfaces to track and measure behavior within the context of an experimental 
simulation. In addition, such methods are unsuited to measuring and understanding negotiation 
behavior as they manifest in social contexts. Chapter 1 demonstrated empirical measurement and 
theory about these contexts was lacking in organizational research. The aim of this study is to 
outline the development of a theory-based measure of negotiation effectiveness that samples 
effective behaviors at each negotiation phase.  
The aim for the NBI is to serve as a survey instrument that facilitates measurement of behaviors 
prior to bargaining, during bargaining, and following the bargaining process. To accomplish this, 
I relied on the list of effective behaviors complied in Study 3. The list represents behavioral 
manifestations of prescriptive theories of negotiation across a variety of social contexts that 
require negotiation ability, and derived from both academic and practitioner investigation. To 
guide the scale development process, I followed the initial sequence of steps in Hinkin’s (1998) 
guideline.  
Theoretical construct definitions 
Effective negotiators enact distinct sets of behaviors during each phase, because the demands on 
negotiators change across phases (Zartman, 2006). The contingent nature of the behaviors justify 
construction of three separate scales to represent behaviors prior to bargaining, during 
bargaining, and following any agreement from bargaining. 
Despite the diversity of sources, the behaviors were largely consistent with existing prescriptive 
theories of the effective negotiator. Theories about effective negotiating developed in legal, law 
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enforcement, and international relations contexts (McMains & Mullins, 2013; Williams, 1985; 
Zartman & Berman, 1983) outline the behaviors expected in each phase. Prior to the bargaining 
process, theories suggest the effectiveness of preparation, such as setting a goal for the 
negotiation, developing a prioritized list of one’s own needs, researching the counterpart, 
understanding the implications of an impasse, and understanding the context surrounding the 
dispute or opportunity with the counterpart. In the bargaining phase, engaging in behaviors that 
contribute to reaching one’s goals, such as making a favorable first offer, discovering and 
satisfying the counterpart’s needs, adopting a strategy/deploying tactics to secure favorable 
terms, and ensuring that there is clear communication with the counterpart. In the post-
bargaining phase, theories suggest effectiveness of behaviors that ensure implementation and 
professional development.  
Correlations with the Big Five 
Study 4 enabled calculation of ab observed correlation between negotiation effectiveness, as 
captured by the NBI, and the Big Five personality factors. If the implicit theories of the 
individual differences experts in Study 3 are reflective of the true underlying association between 
conscientiousness and negotiation effectiveness, conscientiousness should correlate with the NBI 
scales positively. The largest correlations should be observed for pre- and post-bargaining 
phases. Based on the results observed in Study 3, I hypothesized that conscientiousness would be 
a stronger correlate of NBI scales compared to the average of the other four factors.  
Gender differences 
As secondary analyses, I plan to examine gender differences on the NBI. Gender differences, in 
particular the tendency for women to achieve lower levels of outcomes in negotiation outcomes, 
have been the topic of much investigation (Kennedy & Kray, 2015). Some researchers have 
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implicated observed differences in negotiation outcomes as a source of the disparities in 
promotions and compensation in the labor market (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stuhlmacher & 
Walters, 1999). Many of the studies investigating gender differences have implicated the role of 
gender stereotypes, or how the expectations that men and women have about women negotiators 
impact the behavior of the counterparts of women negotiators (e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; 
Bowles & Flynn, 2010). That is, much of the research on gender differences in negotiation has 
been studied through the lens of how women negotiators are treated by their counterparts. But far 
fewer in number are studies that directly examine gender differences negotiation behaviors. 
Thus, exploratory analyses that examine men and women’s reports of negotiation differences on 
the NBI may elucidate potential gender differences in behavior across the negotiation process.  
2.3.1 Methods 
Item Generation Process 
To generate a list of effective behaviors in each phase, I drew potential items from the list of 
effective behaviors compiled in Study 3. Fifty behaviors that most closely represented the 
conceptual definition were selected, and transformed into questionnaire items. Because effective 
negotiation behaviors are thought to be appropriate to a specific phase (Zartman, 2006), I 
grouped together items belonging to the pre-bargaining, bargaining, and post-bargaining phases. 
The full list of items are shown in Table 5a, b, and c. 
Participants and procedure 
N = 500 participants were recruited from an online pool (Prolific Academic; https://prolific.ac). 
Prolific Academic is an online participant pool, solely intended for researchers advertising paid 
behavioral studies, and participants wishing to participate solely in such studies. The pool aims 
to provide participants with an ethical level of compensation to participants, stipulating payment 
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of at least 5 GBP / 7.50 USD per hour. This participant pool is composed of a more culturally 
diverse participant pool (Woods, Velasco, Levitan, Wan, & Spence, 2015), but for the purposes 
of this study, only US citizens were recruited to ensure cultural homogeneity across participants. 
The average age of participants was 29.67 (SD = 10.30) and 231 were females. They were 
mostly white (77%), employed (69% employed either full or part time), and 40% were students. 
All participants were US citizens, were compensated at a rate of 7.50 USD an hour, and took an 
average of 26 minutes to complete the study. 
Participants were recruited as part of a larger study advertised as an investigation of personality. 
The larger study aimed to study how individual differences variables in the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health project relate to the Big Five constructs. After 
an initial collection of data revealed that participants could complete the NBI within the time 
allocated for the larger study, the NBI was added to the battery of measures. The measures 
included in the larger study involved a scale of network perceptions currently under 
development, the Life Orientation Scale-revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), the 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (Blais & Weber, 2006), Self-Monitoring Scale (Lennox & 
Wolfe, 1984), the facet level measures of the Big Five in the Analogue to Multiple Broadband 
Inventory items (Yarkoni, 2010), and individual differences questions from Wave I and Wave II 
of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Harris et al., 2009), in 
addition to the measures below.   
Four hundred and thirty-nine participants provided complete responses on the NBI. Participants 
provided ratings for the NBI on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 – Would not do this at all to 7 – 
Would do this a great deal). Participants were shown pre-bargaining, bargaining, and post-
bargaining items on separate screens, with each set of items given preambles to indicate their 
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phase (e.g. “The questions below refer to behaviors involved in preparing for a negotiation. To 
what extent would you do the following behaviors to prepare for a negotiation?”), in addition, 
participants were provided with a glossary for terminology they may be unfamiliar with 
(Appendix H). Thus the instructions requested participants to refer not to a specific negotiation, 
but how they would negotiate in general. Future validation of the scale will need to examine if 
the NBI is sensitive to variability of behavior in a particular negotiation.  
Participants also completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999), which 
assessed levels of openness (α = .83), conscientiousness (α = .88), extraversion (α = .89), 
agreeableness (α = .82), and neuroticism (α = .91). Participants provided ratings for the BFI on a 
5-point Likert-type scale (1 – Very inaccurate to 5 – Very accurate).  
2.3.4 Results  
Data Treatment Overview 
The sample was split into two halves. A test sample (N = 219) was generated for purposes of 
exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to observe the initial factor structure. A confirmatory sample 
(N = 220) was generated to attempt replication of the factor structure using confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). The sample was split randomly, using a random number generator. Items 
representing behaviors in the pre-bargaining, bargaining, and post-bargaining phases were 
analyzed separately for factor structure because prior theory suggested a discrete sets of 
behaviors being relevant to the three phases.  
EFA on pre-bargaining items 
Examination of pre-bargaining behavior items indicated evidence of underlying factors. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic examines the factorability of a set of items by examining 
the correlations between items partialing out the influence of other variables. If a common factor 
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among variables is present, one would expect small partial correlations between variables. A 
KMO value of .60 or greater is considered acceptable for investigating the factorability of a set 
of variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). For the pre-bargaining items, this value was high (.91). 
In addition, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was conducted on the pre-bargaining items to examine 
factorability. Bartlett’s test examines if the correlation matrix of the variables under study 
departs significantly from an identity matrix. The reproduction of an identity matrix among a set 
of variables would indicate no correlation among items, and thus, evidence of no underlying 
factors. Bartlett’s test was significant (χ2 (231) =2584.43, p = 0), indicating the presence of 
common factors.  
The items were then subjected to a parallel analysis to determine the numbers of factors to 
extract. Parallel analysis determines the number of factors by comparing the eigenvalues of 
factors extracted from the data to the number of factors from a random permutation of the dataset 
(Revelle, 2015). The number of factors with eigenvalues that exceed those derived from the 
random permutation of the data are the number of factors to be extracted. Analyses suggested a 4 
factor solution for pre-bargaining phase. An ordinary least squares minimum residual factoring 
with oblimin rotation was conducted. I retained items with loadings greater than .30 on a given 
factor and cross-loadings of no greater than .30 were retained (Kline, 1994). The items and factor 
loadings are shown in Table 5a. Table 6a displays the factor intercorrelations.  
The four factors reflected unique aspects of pre-negotiation effectiveness: Setting the arena 
(Cronbach’s α = .86), researching the counterpart (α = .88), understanding the impasse (α = 
.78), and preparing the self (α = .83). Items in the setting the arena factor consisted of behaviors 
that contribute to information gathering, preparing the counterpart to negotiate, and ensuring 
negotiations can take place without obstructions (16% of variance accounted). Items in the 
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researching the counterpart factor consisted of behaviors that contribute to understanding the 
counterpart, such as their goals, past behavior, emotional state, and their interests (15% of 
variance accounted). Items in the understanding the impasse factor consisted of behaviors 
attuned to understanding the implications of an impasse and one’s bottom line (11% of variance 
accounted). Finally items in the preparing the self factor consisted of behaviors that contribute to 
explicitly outlining one’s goals for the negotiation, and ensuring one has the resources and 
competence to negotiate effectively (11% of variance accounted).  
CFA on pre-bargaining items 
A CFA model that tested the fit of the four factor model suggested by the EFA fit the data 
suggested acceptable fit (χ2 (210) = 2560.89, p = 0; TLI = .81; RMSEA = .10; SRMR = .08). All 
of the loadings from the items to their respective factors were positive and significant (all p-
values below p =.001). The four factor model represented a superior fit to the model as compared 
to a one factor model in which all of the items loaded onto a single latent variable (Δχ2(6) = 
314.84, p < .001).   
EFA on bargaining items 
Bargaining behavior items showed factor adequacy (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic = .89; 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (171) = 1550.60, p < 10-219). Parallel analysis suggested a four 
factor solution. The same EFA procedures for the pre-bargaining items were applied to these 
items. The items and factor loadings are shown in Table 5b, and factor intercorrelations are 
shown in Table 6b. 
75 
 
Table 5. Pattern Matrices Generated from Exploratory Factor Analyses of the Negotiation Behavior Inventory.   
(a) Pre-bargaining items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Retained items are indicated with loadings in bold. 
76 
 
(b) Bargaining items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Retained items are indicated with loadings in bold. 
 
77 
 
(c) Post-Bargaining items 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Retained items are indicated with loadings in bold.
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The two interpretable factors, interest based bargaining (α = .76) and concern for counterpart (α 
= .76), describe unique domains of effectiveness in the bargaining process. Items in the interest 
based bargaining factor reflect efforts to craft an agreement that includes all of the issues being 
negotiated, understand the counterpart’s needs, and review offers against one’s needs (16% of 
variance accounted). Items in the concern for counterpart factor indicate behaviors that 
contribute to maintaining a positive atmosphere and to ensure that the counterpart’s needs are 
met (12% of variance accounted).  
CFA on bargaining items 
A CFA model that tested the fit of the two factor model suggested by the EFA fit the data 
suggested adequate fit (χ2 (28) = 463.51, p < .001; TLI = .89; RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .06). All 
of the loadings from the items to their respective factors were positive and significant (all p-
values below p =.001). The two factor model represented a superior fit to the model as compared 
to a one factor model in which all of the items loaded onto a single latent variable (Δχ2(1) = 
37.41, p < .001).   
EFA on post-bargaining items 
Post-bargaining behavior items showed factor adequacy (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic = .87; 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (36) = 856.49, p < 10-155). Parallel analyses suggested a three factor 
solution. The same EFA procedures for the pre-bargaining items were applied to these items. 
Two interpretable factors emerged. The items and factor loadings are shown in Table 5c. The 
factors yielded behaviors that assessed implementation and feedback seeking: implementation (α   
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Table 6. Intercorrelations among NBI factors.  
(a) Pre-bargaining factors 
 
 
 
(b) Bargaining factors  
 
 
 
(c) Post-bargaining factors 
 
 
Note. In the tables above, factor intercorrelations from EFA analyses are reported.  
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= .76), reviewing the agreement (α = .72), and seeking feedback (α = .79). Implementation items 
related to expressing commitment for the agreement, checking to have met the counterpart’s 
concerns, and forming a plan to implement the agreement (21% of variance accounted). 
Reviewing the agreement items addressed behaviors related to comparing the implemented deal 
to the agreement (21% of variance accounted). Seeking feedback items related to periodically 
consulting peers and from more experienced negotiators about one’s negotiation abilities (16% 
of variance accounted). 
CFA on post-bargaining items 
A CFA model that tested the fit of the three factor model suggested by the EFA fit the data 
suggested mediocre fit (χ2 (28) = 531.10, p < .001; TLI = .80; RMSEA = .13; SRMR = .07). All 
of the loadings from the items to their respective factors were positive and significant (all p-
values below p =.001). The two factor model represented a superior fit to the model as compared 
to a one factor model in which all of the items loaded onto a single latent variable (Δχ2(3) = 
104.24, p < .001).   
Table 7 shows the means and standard deviations of the subscales of the NBI and the Big Five 
factors, and their correlations for the full sample. The subscales correlate positively, 
demonstrating that a person likely to engage in one effective behavior is likely to engage in other 
effective behaviors. Correlations between the retained factors and the Big Five demonstrate 
positive correlations between conscientiousness and effective behaviors across negotiation 
phases. With the exception of one instance, conscientiousness correlated positively with all 
subscales, with the exception being a marginally significant positive correlation. Among the 
strongest correlations in were between conscientiousness and behaviors in the pre- and post-  
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Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among NBI Subscales and the Big Five. N = 439 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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negotiation phases, providing evidence consistent with the ratings of individual difference 
experts observed in Study 3. In addition, openness and extraversion correlated moderately with 
effective behaviors across phases. 
To further study the associations between the Big Five factors and the NBI subscales, I repeated 
the analyses conducted in Study 3. In a series of regressions displayed in Table 8, I regressed 
each of the eight NBI subscale scores on the Big Five factors, and then estimated planned 
contrasts. The contrasts tested for differences between the coefficient for conscientiousness, and 
the average of the remaining coefficients. Out of nine contrasts (i.e., one for each NBI subscale), 
the coefficient for conscientiousness was higher than the average of the remaining coefficients in 
six cases (setting the arena t = 2.07, p = .04; understanding the impasse, t = 4.02, p < 10-4; 
preparing the self t = 4.08, p < 10-4; interest based bargaining t = 3.59, p < .001; implementation 
t = 2.51, p = .01; reviewing the agreement t = 2.66, p = .01). For the remaining three subscales, 
the coefficient for conscientiousness was either non-significantly different, or lower than the 
average of the remaining coefficients (subscales for researching the counterpart, t = 1.89, p = 
.06 and concern for counterpart, t = -.26, p = .80; seek feedback t = -2.02, p = .04). 
Gender differences  
I examined gender differences in NBI subscale scores. Two significant differences emerged. 
Men reported higher levels of researching the counterpart in the pre-bargaining phase (Male M 
= 4.97, SD = 1.12; Female M = 4.60, SD = 1.23, t = 3.29, p = .01, Cohen’s D = .32), but the 
difference was small in magnitude. The only other difference in subscale scores was on reports 
of comprehensiveness in the bargaining phase, with women reporting higher levels of concern 
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Table 8. Regression of NBI Subscales on Big Five Factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients are reported. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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for counterpart (Male M = 5.39, SD = 1.01; Female M = 5.66, SD = 1.10, t = -2.65, p = .01, D = 
-.26), but again, the difference was small in magnitude. Examining gender differences while 
controlling for the Big Five factors in a series of regressions resulted in a largely similar pattern, 
with men reporting higher levels of researching the counterpart (Beta = -.18, t = -3.98, p <.001), 
with no other significant differences observed.  
2.3.5 Discussion 
Supporting and replicating the results of Study 3, conscientiousness showed sizable correlations 
with effective behaviors in all phases. The empirical correlations in Study 4 also revealed an 
additional role for openness to experience and extraversion in influencing effective behaviors 
that the individual experts did not predict. But the consistent and sizable influence of 
conscientiousness across phases of negotiation was replicated.  
The contribution of this study was to highlight the development of a theory-based measure of 
negotiation effectiveness. A survey instrument has the potential to be deployed with minimal 
cost and effort, facilitating measurement and subsequent theory building about phases of 
negotiation often left unexamined by organizational researchers. Organizational researchers have 
typically made methodological choices that limited the breadth of measurement but increased 
precision of measurement. Doing so has left much of the research examining ever finer gradients 
of behavior within the parameters set by researchers, or more often the case, the parameters set 
by previous researchers who designed the particular simulation. Missing from such research is 
the ability to describe and theorize about negotiations as they occur in social contexts. Although 
the NBI represents a sampling of only the behaviors theorized to be effective, the potential to 
study their influence across a broad variety of contexts still represents a considerable increase in 
capability to measure behavior.  
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A second contribution was to provide further clues for resolving the conscientiousness paradox 
(Sharma et al., 2013). As observed in Study 3, the influence of conscientiousness were most 
apparent in aspects of the pre-bargaining and post-bargaining phases. Conscientiousness is likely 
to be the individual differences antecedent to many consequential behaviors away from the 
bargaining table. This raises a larger question of the generality of the individual differences 
effects observed in the context of stylized negotiation tasks. In general, the personality effect 
sizes (effective behaviors) observed in Study 4 are largely moderate and mostly significant, 
whereas personality effect sizes on outcomes (individual and joint economic value, subjective 
value) observed by Sharma and colleagues (2013) are largely small and non-significant. If 
conscientiousness is not an exceptional personality factor with respect to its apparent restricted 
influence when studied within the bounds of a simulation study, this suggests much of what we 
know about personality influences through negotiations is likely to be misleading. Future 
research will need to systematically address this issue.  
There are many limitations of this initial scale development study. Although the initial steps of 
the NBI’s development was outlined, future extensions to this work will be necessary to better 
understand and enhance the psychometric properties of the NBI. For example, assessment of the 
convergent and divergent validity of the NBI will be needed (Hinkin, 1998). A lack of 
measurement tools designed to assess behavior in the pre- and post- bargaining phases will prove 
to be a barrier to obtaining such forms of validity. Currently, I am only aware of one measure 
which could plausibly correlate with any NBI subscale: the integrative self-efficacy scale (ISE; 
Sullivan, O’Connor, & Burris, 2006). The ISE measures the extent to which people perceive they 
can engage in integrative behaviors (establishing rapport, find tradeoffs, exchange concessions, 
maximize both parties’ interests), which should positively correlate with the working for mutual 
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benefit subscale of the NBI. In contrast, the distributive self-efficacy measure (DSE; Sullivan, 
O’Connor, & Burris, 2006), assesses one’s efficacy beliefs in dominating the negotiation 
(convince other to agree with you, prevent other from exploiting weakness, gain the upper hand, 
persuade other to make most concessions), which should correlate negatively with the working 
for mutual benefit subscale. Those measures are the only measures that approximate negotiation 
behavior, but are limited to the scope of the bargaining phase.  
Demonstrating the criterion validity of the NBI will be necessary to demonstrate its use as a valid 
tool to measure negotiation behavior. To that end, it is worth considering what might be a 
plausible criterion to evaluate the predictive power of the NBI. Because of a lack of validated 
self-report measurement tools to measure behavior in each phase of negotiation, one approach 
might be to rely on peer or supervisor reports of negotiation effectiveness in a particular context. 
That is, peers or supervisors are able to observe the negotiation behaviors of focal individuals. 
To the extent that those peers and supervisors can be considered competent judges or experts of 
negotiating in a particular context, people’s efforts to negotiate while attempting to fulfill their 
role as an organizational member charged with a negotiation role. For example, lawyers within a 
firm may be in a position to evaluate each other’s behavior when attempting to resolve a dispute 
for a client, observe the bargaining tactics of a fellow lawyer, and to observe their 
implementation efforts. If effective behaviors in each phase contribute to the realization of a 
valued outcome, then peers or supervisors who observe both the focal person as throughout the 
negotiation process should be able to incorporate such observations into an appraisal of a focal 
negotiator. Sharma’s (2015) supervisor measure of negotiator evaluation may serve this purpose. 
The measure aims to assess a focal supervisor’s perception of a subordinate’s integrative and 
attitudinal structuring, distributive behaviors, and internal consensus building behaviors. The 
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items also incorporate elements of pre-bargaining preparation (How effective is the employee… 
In planning systematically a sequence of activities prior to negotiations?), and bargaining tactics 
(How effective is the employee…In leveraging their alternative as a source of power during 
negotiations?). Future studies to validate the NBI using Sharma’s (2015) measure is currently in 
its planning phase, with connections with law enforcement officers made.  
Examination of gender differences on the NBI revealed only small differences on tendencies for 
men to report a higher level of researching the counterpart and for women to report higher levels 
of attempting to reach a comprehensive deal. Neither difference was large. In analyses not 
reported, item level differences between genders was examined. Most significant differences 
occurred with items that belonged to the factors listed above, with differences in the direction 
indicated at the subscale level score. Again, the two effect sizes associated with significant 
differences were small when the Big Five were not accounted for (absolute value of Cohen’s D = 
.26 ~ 32), and only one significant difference remained when the Big Five were accounted for. 
This pattern is suggestive of minor differences in negotiation behavior, but not a large disparity 
in enacting (or, more accurately, claiming to enact) effective negotiation behaviors. Future 
research, with the criterion validated NBI, will be required to replicate this pattern. But if these 
results do emerge in a future study, it would suggest that the negotiation behaviors of men and 
women in the field are more similar than they are different, replicating a previous finding that 
when men and women are evaluated for negotiation ability in an employment setting that 
requires negotiation ability (i.e., legal profession), no differences in effectiveness were observed 
(Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, & Amanatullah, 2009). These results contrast with findings that 
show gender differences in outcomes (e.g., Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), but a recent large-
scale review shows many studies that show the effect could be a symptom of the research 
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paradigms typically deployed. Many studies involve single-shot interactions between parties 
(experimental simulations). When negotiation effectiveness is measured in a relational context – 
one that affords repeated interactions between parties that serve to ameliorate the effects of 
stereotypes that might be relied upon in situations of zero acquaintance – gender differences may 
be less or not apparent (Kennedy & Kray, 2015).  
2.4 Study 5 – Conscientiousness and Negotiation Outcomes 
in a Complex Simulation  
Studies 3 and 4 revealed converging evidence that conscientiousness correlates with effective 
behaviors, especially those relating to the pre- and post- bargaining phases. Both studies share a 
limitation in that they relied on self-reported data, which are potentially affected by common 
method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). In Study 5, I aimed to 
demonstrate the correlation between conscientiousness and negotiation effectiveness through the 
use of a complex simulation.  
Although a consistent argument made throughout the thesis is that organizational scholars may 
have over-relied on the simulation method, the criticism is made with reference to its use to 
study the bargaining phase almost exclusively. Similar methodological choices among 
organizational scholars limit the ability of the field to reveal aspects of the phenomenon, but the 
same method could still be used to study all three phases of negotiation. For example, Mislin and 
colleagues (2011) conducted and experimental study of negotiation using a simulation that 
explored the consequence of behavior across negotiation phases. In Study 1 of their paper, part 
of the simulation involved the opportunity of the participants to engage in verbal communication 
via instant messaging on a computer workstation. Dyads then engaged in a simulated labor 
contract in which participants assigned to employee and employer roles negotiated over the 
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payment structure and amount. If an agreement was struck, employees chose a level of costly 
expenditure, which modeled the implementation of a labor contract. This design tested the effect 
of pre-bargaining rapport building on post-bargaining implementation effort. Thus, simulation 
studies can be used to yield insights about multiple phases of negotiation. In Study 5, I aim to 
leverage a complex simulation that could be used to study the impact of pre-negotiation 
preparation process on negotiated outcomes.  
Moms.com (Tensbrunsel & Bazerman, 2012) is a two-party, multi-issue simulation regarding the 
syndication of a television show. Briefing materials specify a buyer and seller role. Participants 
assigned to these roles must negotiate three key issues: the licensing fee per episode, runs per 
episode (i.e., number of times an episode can be shown), and financing terms (i.e., the amounts 
to be paid over a 5 year period). The licensing fee is a distributive issue, with higher fees 
benefiting the seller. The remaining issues can be traded in an integrative way. The buyer prefers 
more runs per episode, whereas the seller prefers financing terms with upfront payment.  
Moms.com offers innovations not commonly featured in other simulations. First, despite being a 
multi-issue negotiation, a payoff matrix is not provided to participants. This is because the issues 
are interdependent. Payoff from the negotiation depends on the combination of all issues, since 
the financing terms modify the percentage of the value gained from the licensing fee – the value 
of proposals are not a simple additive function of payoffs on individual issues. To determine the 
value of any proposal requires the application of a formula. Without prepared electronic 
spreadsheets, or pre-calculation of possible offers, the value of proposals are far more difficult to 
evaluate than when a payoff matrix is utilized. Those who make such preparations should be in 
an advantageous position compared to those who may have little idea about the value of the 
proposals they make or evaluate.  
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Second, the briefing materials mention, though do not mandate or even emphasize, the 
possibility of making a deal on the syndication of an additional show (Juniors). Making a trade 
involving this additional show can benefit both negotiators, but parties must spend time 
discussing and considering this possibility in order to find the positive zone of agreement. 
Specifically, the reporting template for the exercise does not explicitly ask about terms for this 
sale, it provides only a vaguely worded open-ended response field: “Other terms of the 
agreement (specify):”. Unless at least one of the parties examined the briefing information 
carefully enough to realize a deal on Juniors could be profitable, the chances of the dyad giving 
it sufficient attention and knowing how to structure terms of a transaction involving the program 
are low.  
Finally, the briefing materials state that profit from any deal represent the forecasted profit based 
on expectations of program ratings that determine advertising revenues. Buyers and sellers 
received very different ratings expectations for the program: briefing notes for buyers are less 
optimistic about ratings (i.e., lower ratings expectations) than sellers. This discrepancy in 
assigned forecasts is not common knowledge. The discrepancy introduces a source of 
disagreement between the parties but one that could be resolved through the development of a 
somewhat more complex contingent agreement with payments dependent on realized ratings for 
the program when aired. The formula could involve profit/revenue sharing, surcharge/rebate 
payments, or some other terminology that makes payment dependent upon rating. Unless parties 
have carefully read through and considered the information offered in the briefing materials, 
these more sophisticated forms of contracting would be difficult to reach. Moms.com does not 
feature a post-bargaining component in which ratings are actually realized so ultimately profits 
remain forecasts only.  
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This simulation features a level of complexity that should favor people who spend more time and 
effort preparing for the task. It is far more complex than simulations that feature a single issue, or 
a simulation that features multiple issues but provide a payoff matrix. A payoff matrix informs 
the participants of all of the potential outcomes in a simulation, and the value associated with 
each outcome. Such a device obviates the need for extensive preparations because it allows 
participants to readily compare the attractiveness of offers with very little effort prior to 
bargaining. In real negotiations, preparation behaviors require considerable effort, and are 
important because they influence the outcome of subsequent phases (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; 
Zartman, 2006). In the context of the Moms.com simulation, preparation entails preparing 
questions and evaluating alternatives prior to the bargaining process, which should greatly 
facilitate the value of agreement reached in the bargaining phase. Evidence from Studies 3 and 4 
indicated that conscientious negotiators will engage in more of these behaviors than non-
conscientious negotiators. Thus, I hypothesize that higher levels of conscientiousness will be 
associated with higher levels of individual gain as represented in the agreement. 
2.4.1 Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
Executive MBA (EMBA) students enrolled in a mid-sized Midwestern university took part in the 
study (N = 408, Age M = 39.16, SD = 8.00, 25% female). The Moms.com simulation was 
completed as part of a two or three day course on negotiations and conflict management. 
Responses across 16 such classes were aggregated to a single dataset. This course is usually 
taken towards the start of the EMBA program. Participants were provided with the briefing 
materials on the first day of the course then instructed, to spend extra time preparing in advance 
of the simulation due to its greater complexity. The actual simulation was usually conducted on 
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the last day of the course. No one monitored participant preparation so they had discretion in 
how much or how little time to prepare for it.  
Measures 
The Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI; Hogan & Hogan, 2007) was used to measure 
conscientiousness as well as other aspects of the Big Five. The HPI represents the Big Five 
factors in seven scales, with conscientiousness represented by the prudence factor (α = .71), 
agreeableness represented by the interpersonal sensitivity factor (α = .57), openness to 
experience represented by the inquisitive (α = .80) and learning approach factors (α = .78), 
neuroticism represented by the adjustment factor (α = .82), and extraversion represented by the 
ambition (α = .80) and sociability factors (α = .83). Alphas reflect those reported in the 2007 HPI 
manual, since I did not have access to the raw data. Personality data were collected midway 
through the EMBA program, so a few months after completing the negotiation and conflict 
management course. The HPI was completed by 326 of the participants. 
The Hogan Business Reasoning Inventory (HBRI; Hogan Assessment Systems, 2014) was used 
to measure reasoning ability. The HBRI assesses tactical reasoning, described as an index of 
problem solving ability, and strategic reasoning, described as an index of a person’s ability to 
identify problems. Both tactical and strategic reasoning assess people’s ability to process and 
solve problems with verbal, quantitative, and graphic information, likely to be present in a 
business setting. Items, reliability, and validity information are currently not available. The data 
Hogan Assessments provided were not raw scores, but percentiles. An overall score that 
combines strategic and tactical reasoning was also available. I used this combined score in the 
analysis as an indicator of overall reasoning ability. The HBRI was completed by 101 
participants.  
93 
 
Participants also completed the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 
2006) after the simulation ended. The SVI assesses people’s perceptions following negotiation, 
with subscales measuring the subjective appraisal of the instrumental outcome, relationship with 
the counterpart, the negotiation process, and the way one conducted themselves during the 
negotiation. An overall score that sums across the four subscales was computed. During data 
collation, I discovered that the number of response options for the Likert-type scales used varied 
slightly across different classes. Thus, I standardized each item within each version of the scale 
deployed, then aggregated scores across versions. The overall score demonstrated high internal 
consistency (α = .90). The SVI was completed by 283 participants. 
2.4.2 Results  
To calculate an index of effectiveness comparable across buyer and seller roles, I standardized 
the raw scores using a Z-score transformation. In addition, a joint value variable, which 
represents the total value generated by the dyad, was calculated by summing the dyad members’ 
raw scores. This value was also standardized using a Z-score transformation. Table 9 shows the 
bivariate correlations between the negotiation outcomes, subjective value, and individual 
differences.  
Examining bivariate correlations between personality factors and negotiated outcomes reveals 
that the only significant correlation between personality and individual outcome is with the HPI 
factor of prudence, an indicator of conscientiousness. The HBRI, an indicator of reasoning 
ability, also correlated positively with individual outcomes.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Negotiation Outcomes and Individual Differences. N = 53~334 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. SVI = Subjective Value Inventory, C: Prudence = Conscientiousness/Prudence, O: Inquisitive = Openness/Inquisitive, O: Learning 
Approach = Openness/Learning approach, N: Adjustment = Neuroticism/Adjustment, E: Ambition = Extraversion/Ambition, E: Sociability 
= Extraversion/Sociability, HBRI = Hogan Business Reasoning Inventory. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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To formally test the association between conscientiousness and negotiation outcomes, I used 
dyadic data analysis approach (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). Because participants in our sample 
negotiated with one other counterpart, both one’s own and the counterpart’s individual differences 
could affect outcomes – i.e., data in one row can affect the outcomes in another row. Thus the data 
may not be independent, violating assumptions for ordinary least squares analysis. Empirically, the 
data were highly interdependent, with correlations between the individual outcomes of the actor (i.e., 
a focal negotiator), and the partner (i.e., the counterpart) being large in magnitude and significant (r = 
-.69, p < .001). High levels of interdependence substantially increases Type I error if not accounted 
for. Kenny and colleagues (2006) suggest a consequential level of noninterdependence to be .45, 
which would increases the probability of Type I error from .05 to .10. Thus, dyadic data analyses 
were necessary to account for the noninterdependence.  
To estimate the dyadic model, I used R commands generated by David Kenny’s (2015) dyadic data 
analysis server (http://davidakenny.net/DyadR/DyadRweb.htm). To test if conscientiousness would 
correlate with individual outcomes, I estimated an initial model in which actor and partner levels of 
prudence was used to predict individual outcomes. 159 dyads were included in the analyses. A test of 
distinguishability was conducted to see if accounting for negotiator role (i.e., seller vs buyer) would 
improve model fit. A comparison in which a model that included dummies for buyer and seller roles 
vs. a model without such dummies yielded a non-significant difference, χ2(4) = 2.66, p = .62, 
suggesting a parsimonious model that does not distinguish between buyer and seller roles was 
appropriate.  
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Figure 5. Dyadic Analysis of the Role of Conscientiousness on Negotiation Outcomes. 
 
Note. Coefficients reported are based on standardized variables.  
Results are shown in Figure 5. The actor effect of prudence was .13 and significant (p = .02), as was 
the partner effect of prudence -.13 (p = .01). The direction of the coefficients suggested a contrast 
model in which the magnitude of the actor and partner effects are equal, but in opposite directions. 
The ratio of the partner effect to the actor effect was k = -1.04 (95% CI = -2.96 ~ -.29), suggesting 
that the gain in individual outcome achieved through one’s own level of conscientiousness comes at 
the cost of a lowered outcome for the counterpart. The R2 for the overall model was .03, and 
explained 5.44% of the total nonindependence.  
To further test the robustness of the result, I estimated a second model that included covariates for 
the remaining HPI factors, age, and gender for both actors and partners, using the same analysis 
strategy. Controlling for the additional variables resulted in an analysis that included 112 dyads. The 
actor effect of prudence was .30 (p <.001), and the partner effect was -.25 (p < .01). Again, the ratio 
of the actor to partner effect suggested a contrast model (k = -.84; 95% CI = -1.41 ~ -.41). The R2 for 
the overall model was .09, and explained 23.68% of the total nonindependence. Dummies for EMBA 
classes were not entered because of collinearity issues – for one class, there are no gender or age data 
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variable, resulting in perfect correspondence between the dummy for that class and both 
demographic variables. Full results for this model are shown in Appendix I.  
I also tested for the association between reasoning ability on individual outcomes using a similar 
dyadic analysis strategy. This resulted in an analysis that included 49 dyads. I estimated a model that 
considered actor and partner reasoning ability and their association with individual outcomes. The 
actor effect of reasoning ability was .20 and marginally significant (p = .07), while the partner effect 
was .04 and not significant (p = .70). The R2 for the overall model was .02. Reasoning ability does 
not appear to predict individual outcomes.  
I estimated a second model that controlled for actor and partner HPI factors, age, and gender, which 
resulted in an analysis that included 31 dyads. The actor effect of reasoning ability was -.19 and not 
significant (p = .23), while the partner effect was .38 and significant (p = .02). The R2 for the overall 
model was .24. According to this model, the counterpart’s reasoning ability contributes to increasing 
one’s own individual outcomes. But this result should be viewed tentatively, given the large number 
of coefficients estimated (20) to the number of observations (62). This result should be replicated 
using a larger sample before being given much weight. Full results for this model are shown in 
Appendix I. 
To estimate the effects of conscientiousness and reasoning ability on joint outcomes, I estimated an 
ordinary least squares model. A dyadic data analysis strategy was not possible since dyad members 
share a common outcome, resulting in no variance across dyad members. I regressed individual and 
joint outcome on reasoning ability, conscientiousness, and their interaction. In additional models, I 
also controlled for the age and gender variables and EMBA class dummies. Results are shown in 
Table 10. The pattern of results indicate reasoning ability to predict joint, but not individual  
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Table 10. Reasoning Ability and Personality Correlates of Negotiation Outcomes 
 
Note. HBRI = Hogan Business Reasoning Inventory, C: Prudence = Conscientiousness/Prudence. † p 
< .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
outcomes. Moreover, reasoning ability and conscientiousness had a multiplicative effect on joint 
outcomes. Simple slopes analysis of the interaction (Figure 6) using the model reported in column 3 
of  Table 10 revealed that reasoning ability impacted joint value for negotiators one standard 
deviation above the mean in conscientiousness (B = 16,164.18, t = 3.47, p <.001), but not for those 
one standard deviation below the mean on conscientiousness (B = -1031.67, t = -.17, p = .87). 
Conscientious and intelligent people are those likely to grow the size of the pie available to divide.  
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Figure 6. Simple Slopes Analysis of Conscientiousness and Reasoning Ability interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. HBRI = Hogan Business Reasoning Inventory 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Conscientiousness was found to predict individual negotiation outcomes in a complex simulation 
which should have favored individuals who spent time and effort in preparation. Dyadic data 
analyses reveal conscientiousness to positively influence not only one’s own outcomes, but also 
to negatively influence the counterpart’s outcome. Conscientiousness appears to shape the 
amount of the total value negotiators are able to claim. But conscientiousness also plays a 
secondary role in shaping that total value. This is because conscientiousness and reasoning 
ability jointly predict the joint value of the agreement. Those high in both conscientiousness and 
reasoning ability are able to create a significantly larger pool of value to split. The interactive 
effect of conscientiousness and reasoning ability is a novel one, as no study to my knowledge has 
attempted to study their joint influence on negotiation in the context of a complex negotiation. 
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These results complement the findings of Studies 3 and 4, in that conscientiousness is shown to 
be a positive correlate of negotiation outcomes, and indirectly demonstrates the role of 
conscientiousness in shaping behavior across negotiation phases. This result also consistent with 
many studies that demonstrate a positive correlation between conscientiousness and  
consequential outcomes across a variety of social contexts (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; 
Borghans et al., 2008).  
The pattern of results also potentially indicate the role of conscientiousness for different aspects 
of negotiation. Negotiation has been characterized as a balancing act in which one must 
simultaneously aim to generate as much value as possible through a collaborative problem 
solving process, and to claim as larger portion of that value as possible (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 
2011). The results of Study 5 point to conscientiousness as playing an important role in both 
value generation and value claiming. This conclusion is consistent with an old observation:  
people prefer negotiating with experienced (i.e., more skilled) negotiators because experienced 
negotiators are able to create better agreements (Fisher et al., 2011). Future studies will need to 
replicate this finding, but the fact that a single individual difference contributes to contrasting 
tasks highlights the potential importance of this characteristic in the context of negotiation.   
Moms.com is a complex simulation that requires effort in parsing the detailed briefing notes. 
Evaluation of offers, multi-issue offers in particular, required calculation that would have been 
difficult to conduct during the bargaining process. Performance on this task would have been 
facilitated by preparation, an investment in effort that conscientious negotiators likely engaged 
in. In real organizational contexts, the deals are likely to be more complex than the simulation 
deployed in this study. Mergers and acquisitions, for example, are likely to involve due diligence 
efforts that span detailed study of an organization’s operations over multiple past years, and 
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projections of long term performance post integration. Although anecdotal, internal Sony 
documents released by Wikileaks (2015), show that a negotiation between a promoter and Sony 
counsel required 27 distinct issues to negotiate, presenting a considerably more complex deal 
than afforded by the simulation. Although the effect size of the effect observed in the dyadic 
analysis may be small in absolute terms, their influence may be important with extremely 
complex negotiations such as ones being negotiated by Sony’s counsel.  
These results also point toward a potential resolution for the conscientiousness paradox in the 
extent literature. Here, defying the paradox, conscientious negotiators achieved more favorable 
outcomes than their less conscientious counterparts. This result indicates that negotiation 
complexity most likely functions as a moderator of the relationship between the trait and the 
outcomes. Complex deals necessitate marshalling effort and resources to prepare for the 
negotiation. So the influence of conscientiousness will be more apparent with more complex 
deals. To be clear, I did not directly examine preparation, but could only indirectly infer that it 
took place. Participants in any given class had equal time to prepare, equal time to negotiate, but 
considerable discretion about how to use that time. Advantages could not have been gained 
through additional endowment of time. The only choice available was how one would use it.  
2.5 General Discussion 
Across three studies, I presented evidence that conscientiousness correlates with negotiation 
effectiveness. To arrive at this conclusion, I adopted methodological approaches that aimed to 
sample from a wider range of behavior than typically examined in experimental studies of 
negotiation. In addition, instead of relying on the value of agreements as the sole indicator of 
effectiveness, I argued that the enactment of effective behaviors should be conceptualized as an 
indicator of effectiveness. To negotiate well requires a sequence of activities across multiple 
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phases of negotiations (Zartman, 2006). Before an offer is even mentioned, effective negotiators 
prepare for the bargaining process. Once bargaining begins, negotiators must maintain efforts to 
benefit not only themselves but their counterparts. If an agreement is reached, negotiators must 
work to implement the terms of the agreement, and can develop as better negotiators by seeking 
feedback from peers and more experienced negotiators. A common thread among many of these 
behaviors is that they appear to be behavioral manifestations of conscientiousness in a 
negotiation context.  
Consistent with this argument, in Study 3, the ratings provided by individual difference experts 
proved indicative of a positive correlation between conscientiousness and effective negotiation 
behaviors. In Study 4, I reported on the initial development of the Negotiation Behavior 
Inventory, a theory based measure of negotiation effectiveness, which showed consistent 
correlation with conscientiousness, as well as openness. In Study 5, the use of a simulation that 
favors prepared parties revealed higher performance for conscientious individuals.  
Prior studies may not have detected the association between conscientiousness and effectiveness 
due to the deployment of simulation methods that emphasized the measurement of cognitions, 
behavior, and affect in the bargaining phase. Most empirical studies of negotiation appear to 
share this design feature as observed in Study 1. But the expression of conscientiousness in 
negotiation is most likely to appear during pre- and post-bargaining phases. The mismatch 
between the phase investigated in most empirical studies, and the phase in which the influence of 
conscientiousness is most evident could have obscured the observation of a positive association.  
Furthermore, I argued that the value of negotiated outcomes calculated at the time of agreement 
does not sufficiently measure negotiation effectiveness. Negotiation requires carrying out a 
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complex sequence of tasks, achieved through enacting behaviors. The extent to which people 
engage in these behaviors should increase the chances of obtaining a favorable outcome and 
thereby determines effectiveness. A program of research that aims to observe, catalogue, 
describe, and explore the antecedents to these behaviors has strong implications for negotiation 
theory and practice. Many academic theories of negotiation are informed by findings generated 
using a form of simulation that models the bargaining process. There are few, or potentially no 
theories that describe what expert negotiators in at least one substantial context (i.e., international 
relations) spend the much of their time actually doing – preparing for and implementing 
agreements (Zartman, 2006). The study of individual differences in the context of prescriptive 
theorizing about negotiations, as in the current set of studies, is one attempt to expand upon 
existing theory and findings.  
To further expand and enrich negotiation theory to describe and predict behavior in the pre- and 
post-bargaining phases will require examining negotiation processes typically not modeled with 
simulation methods, such as relationships that exist prior to and following the bargaining 
process. Theories of negotiation have pointed to social capital as being an indication of 
effectiveness (Gelfand et al., 2006; Rubin & Brown, 1975), yet few attempts have been made to 
describe and measure such capital in the negotiation context, with some notable exceptions 
(Bottom et al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2009; Mislin et al., 2011). Describing and measuring such 
social capital, identifying their individual difference antecedents, as well as finding the 
conditions under which they are built, maintained, and lost, will be key to developing a more 
detailed theory of negotiation outcomes.  
The organizational implications for a research program that focuses on the antecedents of 
effective behaviors, and a multi-dimensional notion of effectiveness are many. It will facilitate 
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efforts to locate the best negotiators, and to develop training that focuses on behaviors that 
maximize obtaining material value as well as to increase social capital. The current research is 
suggestive of the benefits of selecting conscientious and intelligent negotiators to assist with 
value generation process, and selecting the conscientious negotiators to claim the value 
generated. Conscientious negotiators are also most likely to display their effectiveness at the pre- 
and post- bargaining phases.  
Negotiation processes and outcomes are influenced by individual differences factors, 
interpersonal factors, contextual factors, and situational factors, among others. For the social 
science of negotiation to provide useful prescriptions for organizations and people who have any 
interest in coordinating, collaborating, and exchanging with others, it must theorize about and be 
able to measure those factors. Despite forewarning from early social psychologists (Deutsch & 
Krauss, 1965) and methodologists (McGrath, 1981), organizational scholars, influenced by the 
typical pattern of unwitting trend following precedents in existing research, have pursued a 
concentrated study of a particular phase of negotiation using a small set of highly similar 
methods and measures. Despite continued warnings from various active scholars and critics of 
the field (Barley, 1991; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1995; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) about the 
limiting potential of the research methodologies typically deployed, these practices continue. 
(Study 1; Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). Jang and Bottom (2016) noted in their experiments on 
anger expression that methods may actually be narrowing still further. They noted that the many 
recently published studies on this subject relied exclusively on one-subject designs whereby each 
subject reacted to manipulated but predetermined sequences of messages sent by the 
experimenter.  This much further narrowing of the methodology and measurement excludes any 
reciprocal interdependence that is the essence of negotiation.   
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The result of methodological monoculture will be a field potentially unaware that many of the 
findings reported will not generalize beyond the laboratory context. Prescriptions that ignore this 
generalizability issue may prove counterproductive when recipients attempt to put them into 
practice.  
To highlight the contributions of this thesis, much of Chapter 1 was aimed at highlighting the 
imbalance in the approach organizational researchers have chosen to study the phenomenon, and 
to demonstrate how theories generated by negotiation scholars diverge from observation of the 
process in the field and from practitioner reports of effective practice. Without this 
demonstration, negotiation scholars may not realize that a critical phase in organizational 
research is to iterate theory by grounding it in real problems (Van de Ven, 2007). The high stakes 
challenges and complexities of law enforcement negotiations, marriage counseling, mergers and 
acquisitions, international relations, and legal negotiations appear to be seldom, if ever, modeled 
in academic studies of negotiations, with researchers instead opting for methods that facilitate 
greater precision in measurement, at the cost of producing results particular to the parameters of 
simulations and populations sampled (cf. Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Largely absent 
from this program of research were aspects of negotiations of critical importance to real 
negotiators – preparation and implementation. To be able to state with some confidence that 
there are no evidence-based theories of preparation is a troubling outcome of that program of 
research.  
Much of Chapter 2 was devoted to taking the first steps toward an individual differences 
approach to negotiation effectiveness and developing methodological tools to further negotiation 
theory. Study 3 was conducted to show that the intuitions of many negotiation scholars, who 
appear to view the phenomenon through the lens of the dominant methodologies they use, 
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contrast with the views of individual differences experts. Namely, in the absence of definitive 
evidence on the topic, negotiation scholars have repeatedly dismissed the role of individual 
differences in negotiation (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Thompson, 1990, cf. 
Sharma et al., 2013). In contrast, individual differences experts produced ratings consistent with 
findings in organizational psychology that show a consistent role for conscientiousness in 
correlating with effectiveness. The implicit theories of individual differences experts were 
replicated in Study 4, with empirical results replicating the result. Study 4 also outlined the 
development of the Negotiation Behavior Inventory, a survey tool with potential to be applied in 
a wide variety of contexts to measure behavior in the field. Further demonstrating its 
psychometric properties, by demonstrating its convergent, divergent, and predictive validity will 
remain key points for future development of the measure. If the measure proves to be valid and 
reliable, it has the potential to furnish researchers with a tool to measure those neglected aspects 
of negotiation. Study 5 provided further evidence for the role of conscientiousness, which help 
negotiators claim value in complex negotiations, and help grow value in combination with 
general ability. 
This dissertation aimed to reveal gaps in the organizational scholarship on negotiation. To 
address these gaps, I introduced theoretical and methodological developments to redress 
imbalance in research practices. Further work along these lines will furnish not only researchers, 
but also practitioners with evidence based theories that answer Raiffa’s (1982) call for useful 
negotiation advice.  
 
 
107 
 
References 
Abdi, H., & Williams, L. J. (2010). Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) test. Encyclopedia of 
Research Design. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1–5. 
Agrawal, A., & Jaffe, J. F. (2000). The post-merger performance puzzle. In Advances in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (Vol. 1, pp. 7–41). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Alexander, J. C. (1991). Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions. 
Stanford Law Review, 43(3), 497–598. http://doi.org/10.2307/1228912 
Ashford, S. J., & Black, J. S. (1996). Proactivity during organizational entry: The role of desire for control. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(2), 199–214. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.81.2.199 
Ayres, I., & Siegelman, P. (1995). Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. The 
American Economic Review, 85(3), 304–321. 
Barley, S. R. (1991). Contextualizing conflict: notes on the anthropology of disputes and negotiations. In 
M. H. Bazerman (Ed.), Research on negotiation in organizations: Vol 3. Handbook of negotiation 
research (pp. 165–199). Greenwich  CT: JAI Press. 
Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The big five personality dimensions and job performance: a meta-
analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44(1), 1–26. 
Barrick, M. R., Stewart, G. L., Neubert, M. J., & Mount, M. K. (1998). Relating member ability and 
personality to work-team processes and team effectiveness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
83(3), 377–391. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.83.3.377 
Barry, B., & Friedman, R. A. (1998). Bargainer characteristics in distributive and integrative negotiation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(2), 345–359. 
Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. (2000). Negotiation. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 51, 279–314. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.279 
108 
 
Bazerman, M. H., & Neale, M. (1992). Negotiating Rationally. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Befu, H. (1977). Social exchange. Annual Review of Anthropology, 6(1), 255–281. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.06.100177.001351 
Bendersky, C., & McGinn, K. L. (2010). Open to negotiation: phenomenological assumptions and 
knowledge dissemination. Organization Science, 21(3), 781–797. 
http://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1090.0487 
Binet, A., & Simon, T. (1916). The development of intelligence in children (the Binet-Simon scale). 
Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins. 
Blais, A. R., & Weber, E. U. (2006). A domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) scale for adult populations. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 1(1), 33–47. 
Borghans, L., Duckworth, A., Heckman, J. J., & Ter Weel, B. (2008). The economics and psychology of 
personality traits. Journal of Human Resources, 43(4), 972–1059. 
http://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.43.4.972 
Bottom, W. P., Holloway, J., Miller, G. J., Mislin, A. A., & Whitford, A. B. (2006). Building a pathway to 
cooperation: negotiation and social exchange between principal and agent. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 51(1), 29–58. http://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.51.1.29 
Bowles, H. R., Babcock, L., & McGinn, K. L. (2005). Constraints and triggers: situational mechanics of 
gender in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 951–965. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.951 
Bowles, H. R., & Flynn, F. (2010). Gender and persistence in negotiation: a dyadic perspective. Academy 
of Management Journal, 53(4), 769–787. http://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2010.52814595 
Braun, D. (2013). Successful acquisitions: a proven plan for strategic growth. New York: AMACOM. 
Buono, A. F., & Bowditch, J. L. (2003). The human side of mergers and acquisitions: managing collisions 
between people, cultures, and organizations. Beard Books. 
109 
 
Cartwright, S., & Schoenberg, R. (2006). Thirty years of mergers and acquisitions research: recent 
advances and future opportunities. British Journal of Management, 17(S1), S1–S5. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2006.00475.x 
Chen, X., & Komorita, S. S. (1994). The Effects of Communication and Commitment in a Public Goods 
Social Dilemma. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 60(3), 367–386. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1994.1090 
Chevalier, J. A., & Mayzlin, D. (2006). The effect of word of mouth on sales: online book reviews. Journal 
of Marketing Research, 43(3), 345–354. 
Conlon, T. J. (2004). A review of informal learning literature, theory and implications for practice in 
developing global professional competence. Journal of European Industrial Training, 28(2–4), 
283–295. 
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Normal personality assessment in clinical practice: The NEO 
Personality Inventory. Psychological Assessment, 4(1), 5–13. http://doi.org/10.1037/1040-
3590.4.1.5 
Costa, P. T., McCrae, R. R., & Dye, D. A. (1991). Facet scales for agreeableness and conscientiousness: A 
revision of the NEO personality inventory. Personality and Individual Differences, 12(9), 887–
898. http://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(91)90177-D 
Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009). Getting off on the right foot: Subjective value versus 
economic value in predicting longitudinal job outcomes from job offer negotiations. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 94(2), 524–534. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0013746 
Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the 
domain of subjective value in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(3), 
493–512. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.493 
110 
 
Darley, J. M., Zanna, M. P., & Roediger, H. L. (2004). The compleat academic: a career guide. 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
de Callières, F. (1716). On the manner of negotiating with princes. (A. F. Whyte, Trans.). New York,  NY: 
Houghton Mifflin co. 
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2004). The influence of power on the information search, 
impression formation, and demands in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
40(3), 303–319. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2003.07.004 
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Weingart, L. R. (2003). Task versus relationship conflict, team performance, and 
team member satisfaction: a meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(4), 741. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.741 
Deschâtres, F., & Sornette, D. (2005). Dynamics of book sales: endogenous versus exogenous shocks in 
complex networks. Physical Review E, 72(1). http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.72.016112 
Deutsch, M., & Krauss, R. M. (1965). Theories in social psychology. New York: Basic Books. 
Dimotakis, N., Conlon, D. E., & Ilies, R. (2012). The mind and heart (literally) of the negotiator: 
Personality and contextual determinants of experiential reactions and economic outcomes in 
negotiation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97(1), 183–193. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0025706 
Elfenbein, H. A., Curhan, J. R., Eisenkraft, N., Shirako, A., & Baccaro, L. (2008). Are some negotiators 
better than others? Individual differences in bargaining outcomes. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 42(6), 1463–1475. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2008.06.010 
Elfenbein, H. A., Foo, M. D., White, J., Tan, H. H., & Aik, V. C. (2007). Reading your counterpart: the 
benefit of emotion recognition accuracy for effectiveness in negotiation. Journal of Nonverbal 
Behavior, 31(4), 205–223. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-007-0033-7 
Eliashberg, J., Lilien, G. L., & Kim., N. (1995). Searching for generalizations in business marketing 
negotiations. Marketing Science, 14(3), G47. 
111 
 
English, A., Griffith, R. L., & Steelman, L. A. (2004). Team performance the effect of team 
conscientiousness and task type. Small Group Research, 35(6), 643–665. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1046496404266320 
Ernst & Young. (1994). Mergers & acquisitions (2nd ed). New York: J. Wiley. 
Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in (3rd ed.,  
ed). New York: Penguin. 
Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: framework for a unified theory of social 
relations. Psychological Review, 99(4), 689–723. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.99.4.689 
Fleeson, W. (2004). Moving personality beyond the person-situation debate. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 13(2), 83–87. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00280.x 
Foo, M.-D., Elfenbein, H. A., Tan, H. H., & Aik, V. C. (2004). Emotional intelligence and negotiation: the 
tension between creating and claiming value. International Journal of Conflict Management, 
15(4), 411–429. 
Fry, W. R., Firestone, I. J., & Williams, D. L. (1983). Negotiation process and outcome of stranger dyads 
and dating couples: do lovers lose? Basic & Applied Social Psychology, 4(1), 1–16. 
Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: the role of perspective-taking and 
negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657–669. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.657 
Geertz, C. (1978). Meaning and order in Moroccan society: three essays in cultural analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gelfand, M. J., Major, V. S., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L. H., & O Brien, K. (2006). Negotiating relationally: the 
dynamics of the relational self in negotiations. Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 427–
451. 
112 
 
Gerhart, B., & Rynes, S. (1991). Determinants and consequences of salary negotiations by male and 
female MBA graduates. Journal of Applied Psychology, 76(2), 256–262. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.76.2.256 
Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, C. R., & Gough, H. G. 
(2006). The international personality item pool and the future of public-domain personality 
measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(1), 84–96. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.08.007 
Gottman, J. M. (1998). Psychology and the study of marital processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 
49(1), 169–197. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.169 
Gottman, J. M., & Silver, N. (1994). Why marriages succeed or fail: what you can learn from the 
breakthrough research to make your marriage last. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Greenhalgh, L., & Chapman, D. (1995). Joint decision making: the inseparability of relationships and 
negotiation. In Negotiation as a social process (pp. 166–186). Thousand Oaks,  CA,  US: SAGE 
Publications. 
Gulliver, P. H. (1979). Disputes & negotiations: a cross-cultural perspective. New York,  NY: Academic 
Press. 
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367–388. http://doi.org/10.1016/0167-
2681(82)90011-7 
Hallgren, K. A. (2012). Computing inter-rater reliability for observational data: an overview and tutorial. 
Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 8(1), 23–34. 
Harris, K. M., Halpern, C. T., Whitsel, E., Hussey, J., Tabor, J., Entzel, P., & Urdy, J. R. (2009). The national 
longitudinal study of adolescent to adult health: research design. Retrieved April 4, 2016, from 
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design 
113 
 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 33(2–3), 61–83. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X 
Hinkin, T. R. (1998). A brief tutorial on the development of measures for use in survey questionnaires. 
Organizational Research Methods, 1(1), 104–121. http://doi.org/10.1177/109442819800100106 
Hogan, R., & Hogan, J. (2007). Hogan Personality Inventory manual (Third Edition). Tulsa, OK: Hogan 
Assessment Systems. Retrieved from 
http://www.mentis.international/assets/04019_hpi_tm_secure.pdf 
Hogan Assessment Systems. (2014). Hogan Business Reasoning Inventory. Tulsa, OK: Hogan 
Assessments. 
Honeyman, C., & Schneider, A. K. (2006). Introduction: “A canon of negotiation” begins to emerge. In 
The negotiator’s fieldbook: the desk reference for the experienced negotiator (pp. 1–6). 
Washington, DC: American Bar Association. 
James, G. (2011). How to say it: business to business selling : power words and strategies from the 
world’s top sales experts. New York, N.Y.: Prentice Hall Press. 
Jang, D., & Bottom, W. P. (2016). Measuring the (dis)utility of expressing anger in negotiations: 
Preferences and efficacy. 
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: history, measurement, and theoretical 
perspectives. In L. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: theory and research (Vol. 
2). New York, NY: Guildford Press. 
Judge, T. A., Cable, D. M., Colbert, A. E., & Rynes, S. L. (2007). What causes a management article to be 
cited: article, author, or journal? The Academy of Management Journal, 50(3), 491–506. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/20159868 
114 
 
Kellogg, C. (2010, December 9). Amazon gives Nielsen BookScan to authors. Retrieved from 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/jacketcopy/2010/12/amazon-gives-nielsen-bookscan-to-
authors.html 
Kennedy, J. A., & Kray, L. J. (2015). A pawn in someone else’s game? The cognitive, motivational, and 
paradigmatic barriers to women’s excelling in negotiation. Research in Organizational Behavior, 
35, 3–28. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2015.09.002 
Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Cook, W. L. (2006). Dyadic data analysis. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Kilmann, R. H., & Thomas, K. W. (1977). Developing a forced-choice measure of conflict-handling 
behavior: the “MODE” instrument. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 37(2), 309–
325. http://doi.org/10.1177/001316447703700204 
Kline, P. (1994). An easy guide to factor analysis. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Larrick, R. P., & Wu, G. (2007). Claiming a large slice of a small pie: asymmetric disconfirmation in 
negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 212–233. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.212 
Lennox, R. D., & Wolfe, R. N. (1984). Revision of the self-monitoring scale. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1984-27678-001 
Letkiewicz, J. C., & Fox, J. J. (2014). Conscientiousness, financial literacy, and asset accumulation of 
young adults. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 48(2), 274–300. http://doi.org/10.1111/joca.12040 
Lewicki, R. J., Barry, B., & Saunders, D. (2010). Essentials of negotiation. McGraw-Hill Education. 
Lewicki, R. J., & Litterer, J. A. (1985). Negotiation. Homewood, Ill: McGraw-Hill. 
Love, L. P., & Stulberg, J. B. (2006). The uses of mediation. In The negotiator’s fieldbook: the desk 
reference for the experienced negotiator (pp. 573–579). Washington, DC: American Bar 
Association. 
115 
 
McGrath, J. E. (1981). Dilemmatics: the study of research choices and dilemmas. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 25(2), 179–210. 
McKersie, R. B., & Walton, R. E. (1966). The theory of bargaining. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
19(3), 414–424. http://doi.org/10.2307/2521084 
McMains, M. J., & Mullins, W. C. (2013). Crisis negotiations: managing critical incidents and hostage 
situations in law enforcement and corrections (5 edition). Amsterdam ; Boston: Anderson. 
Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 4(1), 1–25. http://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(68)90046-2 
Misino, D. J. (2004). Negotiate and win: unbeatable real-world strategies from the NYPD’s top negotiator 
(1 edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Mislin, A. A., Campagna, R. L., & Bottom, W. P. (2011). After the deal: talk, trust building and the 
implementation of negotiated agreements. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 115(1), 55–68. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.01.002 
Molloy, G. J., O’Carroll, R. E., & Ferguson, E. (2013). Conscientiousness and medication adherence: a 
meta-analysis. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 47(1), 92–101. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12160-
013-9524-4 
Morgan, P. M., & Tindale, R. S. (2002). Group vs Individual Performance in Mixed-Motive Situations: 
Exploring an Inconsistency. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 87(1), 44–
65. http://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2001.2952 
Mount, M. K., Barrick, M. R., & Stewart, G. L. (1998). Five-factor model of personality and performance 
in jobs involving interpersonal interactions. Human Performance, 11(2/3), 145–165. 
Noesner, G. (2010). Stalling for time: my life as an FBI hostage negotiator. New York: Random House. 
116 
 
O’Connor, K. M., & Carnevale, P. J. (1997). A nasty but effective negotiation strategy: misrepresentation 
of a common-value issue. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(5), 504–515. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167297235006 
Ohbuchi, K., Chiba, S., & Fukushima, O. (1996). Mitigation of interpersonal conflicts: politeness and time 
pressure. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(10), 1035–1042. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/01461672962210007 
Pinkley, R. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (2000). Get paid what you’re worth: the expert negotiator’s guide to 
salary and compensation. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in 
behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879. 
Police Executive Research Forum. (2015). Re-engineering training on police use of force. Washington, 
D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. Retrieved from 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf 
Pritchett, D. P. (2014). After the merger: managing the shockwaves (3rd edition). Homewood, Ill.: 
Pritchett, LP. 
Pruitt, D. G. (2012). A history of social conflict and negotiation research. In A. W. Kruglanski & S. 
Margaret (Eds.), Handbook of the history of social psychology (pp. 431–452). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Belmont, CA, US: Thomson 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. (1975). Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(4), 621–633. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.31.4.621 
117 
 
Rackham, N. (1988). SPIN Selling (1st edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rackham, N. (2004). The spin selling fieldbook. McGraw-Hill Education (India) Pvt Limited. 
Raiffa, H. (1982). The art and science of negotiation. Harvard University Press. 
Revelle, W. (2015). Constructs, components, and factor models. In An introduction to psychometric 
theory with applications in R (pp. 145–202). Retrieved from http://www.personality-
project.org/r/book/Chapter6.pdf 
Roberts, R. D., MacCann, C., Matthews, G., & Zeidner, M. (2010). Emotional intelligence: toward a 
consensus of models and measures: emotional intelligence. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 4(10), 821–840. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00277.x 
Rogers, M. E., & Creed, P. A. (2008). The role of personality in adolescent career planning and 
exploration: A social cognitive perspective. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 73(1), 132–142. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2008.02.002 
Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Ruble, T. L., & Thomas, K. W. (1976). Support for a two-dimensional model of conflict behavior. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16(1), 143–155. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(76)90010-6 
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Bridges, M. W. (1994). Distinguishing optimism from neuroticism (and 
trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): a reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1063–1078. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.67.6.1063 
Scott, E. S., & Scott, R. E. (1998). Marriage as relational contract. Virginia Law Review, 84(7), 1225–1334. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/1073673 
118 
 
Sharma, S. (2015, August 15). The role of affect, personality, and intelligence in negotiation (Doctoral 
Thesis). Washington University in Saint Louis, Saint Louis, MO, USA. Retrieved from 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/543 
Sharma, S., Bottom, W. P., & Elfenbein, H. A. (2013). On the role of personality, cognitive ability, and 
emotional intelligence in predicting negotiation outcomes: a meta-analysis. Organizational 
Psychology Review, 3(4), 293–336. http://doi.org/10.1177/2041386613505857 
Starbuck, W. H. (2011, January 14). What the numbers mean. Retrieved March 28, 2016, from 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/whatmean.html 
Sternberg, R. J. (1999). The theory of successful intelligence. Review of General Psychology, 3(4), 292–
316. http://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.3.4.292 
Sternberg, R. J., Conway, B. E., Ketron, J. L., & Bernstein, M. (1981). People’s conceptions of intelligence. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41(1), 37–55. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.41.1.37 
Sternberg, R. J., Wagner, R. K., Williams, W. M., & Horvath, J. A. (1995). Testing common sense. 
American Psychologist, 50(11), 912–927. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.50.11.912 
Stevens, C. K., Bavetta, A. G., & Gist, M. E. (1993). Gender differences in the acquisition of salary 
negotiation skills: the role of goals, self-efficacy, and perceived control. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 78(5), 723–735. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.78.5.723 
Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Walters, A. E. (1999). Gender differences in negotiation outcome: A meta-analysis. 
Personnel Psychology, 52(3), 653–677. 
Sullivan, B. A., O’Connor, K. M., & Burris, E. R. (2006). Negotiator confidence: The impact of self-efficacy 
on tactics and outcomes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(5), 567–581. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.09.006 
119 
 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics (6. ed., internat. ed). Boston, Mass.: 
Pearson. 
Tensbrunsel, A. E., & Bazerman, M. H. (2012). Moms.com. Evanston, IL: Dispute Resolution Research 
Center, Northwestern University. 
Thompson, L. L. (1990). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: empirical evidence and theoretical issues. 
Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 515–532. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.515 
Thompson, L. L. (Ed.). (2006). Negotiation theory and research. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Thompson, L. L. (2012). The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator. Pearson Education Incorporated. 
Thompson, L. L. (2013). The Truth About Negotiations. FT Press. 
Tinsley, C. H., Cheldelin, S. I., Schneider, A. K., & Amanatullah, E. T. (2009). Negotiating your public 
identity: women’s path to power. Rethinking Negotiation Teaching: Innovations for Context and 
Culture, 71–87. 
Turock, B. J. (2013). Library and book trade almanac 2013. (D. Bogart, Ed.). Medford, NJ. 
Van de Ven, A. H. (2007). Engaged scholarship: a guide for organizational and social research. Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
Wagner, R. K., & Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Practical intelligence in real-world pursuits: the role of tacit 
knowledge. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(2), 436–458. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.2.436 
Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1965). A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: an analysis of a social 
interaction system. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Weingart, L. R., Prietula, M. J., Hyder, E. B., & Genovese, C. R. (1999). Knowledge and the sequential 
processes of negotiation: a Markov Chain analysis of response-in-kind. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 35(4), 366–393. http://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1999.1378 
WikiLeaks - Sony Archives. (2015). Retrieved April 4, 2016, from https://wikileaks.org/sony/emails/ 
120 
 
Williams, G. R. (1985). A lawyer’s handbook for effective negotiation and settlement. Seattle, WA: 
Washington State Bar Association. 
Wit, A. P., & Kerr, N. L. (2002). “Me versus just us versus us all” categorization and cooperation in nested 
social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 616–637. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.3.616 
Woods, A. T., Velasco, C., Levitan, C. A., Wan, X., & Spence, C. (2015). Conducting perception research 
over the internet: a tutorial review. PeerJ, 3, e1058. http://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.1058 
Yarkoni, T. (2010). The abbreviation of personality, or how to measure 200 personality scales with 200 
items. Journal of Research in Personality, 44(2), 180–198. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2010.01.002 
Zartman, I. W. (2006). Process and stages. In A. K. Schneider & C. Honeyman (Eds.), The negotiator’s 
fieldbook: the desk reference for the experienced negotiator (pp. 95–98). Washington, DC, USA: 
American Bar Association. 
Zartman, I. W., & Berman, M. R. (1983). The practical negotiator (Reprint edition). New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
121 
 
Appendix A. Negotiation Advice Coding 
Sheet 
Description of the book 
Full citation of book/book section (APA style): 
Social activity given in the book (e.g., legal/marriage/mergers and acquisitions): 
Instructions: Read sections of books that introduce the concept of the book, such as the preface or the introduction in order to 
answer the questions below.  
Does the author have graduate level training (PhD or Masters)?    Yes/No 
If yes, in what field? 
Does the author claim expertise in the social activity they give advice in?  Yes/No 
If yes, what is the nature of the expertise? Provide a quote/s and page numbers. 
Does the author claim to have a description of the negotiation process, either by mentioning a “theory” or “model” or indicate via 
other means that some description exists?      Yes/No 
If yes, list the page numbers where the model is described.  
Was the advice generated using social science?     Yes/No 
If yes, provide a quote and page number that indicates this.  
Was the advice generated using expert knowledge?    Yes/No 
If yes, provide a quote and page number that indicates this. 
 
Coding the advice 
Procedure: To locate advice, search the content section to locate a “best/recommended practices” chapter or its equivalent. If such 
a chapter is not explicitly found, read through the book in its entirety to look for advice.  
Advice is any behavior that the author recommends a person to do to increase their effectiveness in negotiation. It may be in the 
form of an overt action or internal thoughts or feelings.  
  
When does the advice apply? 
Page No Advice Pre-bargain? Bargain? Post-bargain? 
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Coding in Study 2 
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Association. 
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Macnaughton, A. L., & Martin, J. G. (Eds.). (2002). Environmental Dispute 
Resolution: An Anthology of Practical Solutions. Chicago, Ill: Amer Bar Assn. 
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Resolution Professionals. (G. V. Brown, Ed.). Washington, DC: American Bar 
Association. 
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Simon & Schuster. 
Marriage Counseling 282,863 
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therapy. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Marriage Counseling 735,340 
Sternberg, R. J., & Hojjat, M. (1997). Satisfaction in close relationships. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Marriage Counseling 933,114 
Kayser, K. (1993). When love dies: the process of marital disaffection. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Marriage Counseling 1,218,297 
Grunebaum, H., & Christ, J. (Eds.). (1976). Contemporary Marriage: Structure, 
Dynamics, and Therapy. Boston: Little Brown & Company. 
Marriage Counseling 1,329,441 
Mace, D. (1987). How to Have a Happy Marriage. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Marriage Counseling 1,399,168 
Glick, I. D., Berman, E. M., Clarkin, J. F., & Rait, D. S. (2000). Marital and 
Family Therapy (4 Sub edition). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association. 
Marriage Counseling 2,784,266 
Bowen, G. L. (1991). Navigating the marital journey: MAP, a corporate support 
program for couples. New York: Praeger. 
Marriage Counseling 4,798,738 
Alford-Cooper, F. (1998). For keeps marriages that last a lifetime. Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe. 
Marriage Counseling 4,823,532 
Feldman, M. L., & Spratt, M. F. (1998). Five Frogs on a Log: A CEO’s Field 
Guide to Accelerating the Transition in Mergers, Acquisitions And Gut 
Wrenching Change (1 edition). New York: HarperBusiness. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
94,082 
Davenport, J., & Barrow, S. (2009). Employee Communication During Mergers 
and Acquisitions. Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Gower. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
103,922 
DePamphilis, D. M. (2013). Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring 
Activities, Seventh Edition: An Integrated Approach to Process, Tools, Cases, and 
Solutions (7th edition). Amsterdam; Boston: Academic Press. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 171,858 
Tibergien, M. C., & Dahl, O. (2006). How to Value, Buy, or Sell a Financial 
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(1 edition). Bloomberg Press: Bloomberg Press. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 313,139 
Braun, D. (2013). Successful Acquisitions: A Proven Plan for Strategic Growth. 
New York: AMACOM. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
380,196 
Whitaker, S. C. (2012). Mergers & Acquisitions Integration Handbook: Helping 
Companies Realize The Full Value of Acquisitions (1 edition). Wiley. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
388,233 
Galpin, T. J. (2014). The Complete Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions: Process 
Tools to Support M&A Integration at Every Level (3 edition). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 410,149 
Reed, S. F., Lajoux, A., & Nesvold, H. P. (2007). The Art of M&A, Fourth 
Edition: A Merger Acquisition Buyout Guide (4 edition). New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 428,475 
Marks, M. L. (1994). From Turmoil to Triumph: New Life After Corporate 
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Downsizing (1 edition). New York : Toronto : New 
York: Jossey-Bass. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 674,336 
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(3rd edition). Homewood, Ill.: Pritchett, LP. 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
695,567 
Mitchell, J. (2003). Hug Your Customers: The Proven Way to Personalize Sales 
and Achieve Astounding Results (1st edition). New York: Hachette Books. 
Sales 1,460 
Rackham, N. (1988). SPIN Selling (1st edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. Sales 1,650 
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New York: Prentice Hall Press. 
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Miller, R. B., Heiman, S. E., Tuleja, T., & Miller, R. B. (2005). The new 
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planning. New York, NY: Warner Business Books. 
Sales 68,073 
Richardson, L. (2008). Perfect Selling (1 edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. Sales 69,798 
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Shell, G. R., & Moussa, M. (2008). The Art of Woo: Using Strategic Persuasion 
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Johnson, S. (2004). The one minute sales person. London: HarperCollins 
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Press. 
Sales 170,751 
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Appendix C. Books Sampled for Advice 
Coding in Study 3 
1. Babcock, L., Gelfand, M., Small, D., & Stayn, H. (2006). Gender Differences in the 
Propensity to Initiate Negotiations. In D. De, M. Zeelenberg, & J. K. Murnighan (Eds.), 
Social psychology and economics (pp. 239–259). Mahwah,  NJ,  US: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Publishers. 
2. Buono, A. F., & Bowditch, J. L. (2003). The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Managing Collisions Between People, Cultures, and Organizations. Beard Books. 
3. Cox, G. (2012). The Financial Times Essential Guide to Negotiations: How to Achieve 
Win-Win Outcomes. Financial Times Prent.Int. 
4. Ernst & Young. (1994). Mergers & acquisitions (2nd ed.). New York: J. Wiley. 
5. Fisher, R., Ury, W. L., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In. Penguin. 
6. Gitomer, J. (2003). The Sales Bible: The Ultimate Sales Resource. Wiley. 
7. Gottman, J. M., Gottman, J. S., & DeClaire, J. (2007). Ten Lessons to Transform Your 
Marriage: America’s Love Lab Experts Share Their Strategies for Strengthening Your 
Relationship. Random House LLC. 
8. Kurtzberg, T. R., & Naquin, C. E. (2011). The Essentials of Job Negotiations: Proven 
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Appendix E. List of Behaviors Rated by 
Individual Differences Experts in Study 4 
Individual differences experts received a list of 205 behaviors to evaluate for their association 
with the Big Five factors and facets, detailed below. 
To prevent fatigue and to allow individual differences experts to complete the task at their own 
pace, the list of behaviors were categorized on the basis of their classification to negotiation 
phases, and by similarity to other behaviors (within-phase categories listed below). Separate 
online surveys were created for each category of negotiation behavior. Experts were instructed to 
complete the series of tasks in sequence, such that pre-bargaining behaviors were rated first, 
bargaining behaviors rated second, and post-bargaining behaviors last.  
Before rating each online survey, they were provided with the following instruction: “Click 
below to start the rating task. In the task, a negotiation related behavior will be presented to you. 
Read each behavior, and provide your opinion on which individual difference/personality aspect 
the behavior seems to reflect.” Individual differences experts then provided their name then 
continued on to the task, to facilitate matching responses across surveys, and to track time spent 
on the task, required for remuneration. Experts spent an average of 15.62 hours on the task.  
For each behavior, experts were reminded of the category of behavior, phase of negotiation 
behavior, and provided with a free response box to list possible individual difference variables 
that could be correlated with the negotiation behavior shown (see example screenshot below): 
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Experts were then asked to indicate if the behavior displayed appeared to be a manifestation of a 
Big Five factor (see example screenshot below): 
 
A non-response to a factor was coded as a “none” (i.e., “0”) response. Clicking on any of the 
factors populated a Likert-type scale that asked experts to indicate the extent (low/medium/high) 
of association between a factor and the behavior displayed. Selecting a factor also populated the 
list of facet labels for that factor. Experts were asked to list the extent of extent 
(low/medium/high) of association between the facets and the behavior displayed. The cascading 
format of the ratings was implemented to reduce expert fatigue. Displaying all possible questions 
(i.e., factor/facet rating questions) for every behavior would have entailed experts having to 
provide 37 responses per behavior (5 factor ratings + “none of the above” + 5*6 facets of each 
factor + free response for other relevant individual differences), or 37 responses *205 behaviors 
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= 7585 active responses in total. A cascading task reduces substantially the amount of effort 
associated with the task, with required responses varying in proportion to the number of relevant 
factors experts observe to be relevant to behaviors. Below, the 205 behaviors are listed in full.  
Pre-bargaining behaviors 
Understanding the self 
Spend time thinking about your goals 
Spend time thinking about your interests 
Research what issues you should negotiate 
Spend time thinking about how your bargaining style affects the negotiation process 
Attempt to adjust your bargaining style to match the negotiation context 
Spend time finding out what authorization you have for making deals 
Prioritize the goals for the negotiation 
Create a table or list of what you value most to what you value least 
Develop a rationale for why you want certain outcomes from the negotiation 
Ensure that you have the necessary resources to follow through with the deal that you reach 
Consider how the goals of the current negotiation fit in with your existing plans 
Spend time considering how you will reap the value achieved by the deal 
Investigate how your counterpart values you or the resources you have 
Spend time anticipating the ways in which you may have to change yourself or your plans to 
accomodate the goal you would like to achieve. 
Maintain competence in the skills needed to analyze the deal (e.g., technical evaluation, 
accounting, developing relationships, etc…) 
Consider how each of the issues will impact you in the short term 
Consider how each of the issues will impact you in the long term 
Spend time identifying your aspirations 
Decide what your bottom line will be 
 
Understanding the counterpart 
 
Spend time thinking about your counterpart's goals 
Spend time thinking about your counterpart's interests 
Spend time studying your counterpart's credentials 
Spend time getting information about your counterpart from their peers 
Spend time studying your counterpart's negotiating history 
Spend time studying your counterpart’s tactics and patterns of behavior in similar situations 
Spend time studying the counterpart’s emotional state as they enter into negotiations 
Attempt to select the best counterpart for the negotiation by comparing them against others 
Spend time studying how the deal you intend to reach will impact your counterpart 
Spend time researching if your counterpart might value things differently than you 
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Spend time researching the counterpart's point of view on the situation 
 
Understanding the bargaining situation 
 
Understand your no-deal options 
Understand your counterpart's no-deal options 
Compare your no-deal option against their no-deal option 
Attempt to identify if there is a long-term relationship at stake with the counterpart 
Decide on the rules and conventions for negotiating 
Attempt to uncover if the different options and issues are related to each other 
Research potential barriers to reaching a deal such as policies, procedures, rules or conventions 
Decide whether third parties, such as a mediator or facilitator should be involved 
Identify and label the assumptions you made prior to negotiation 
Consider what a really good offer would be, given what you know about your situation and the 
counterpart's situation 
Determine if the negotiation stems from a dispute (disagreements about the past) 
Determine if the negotiation stems from a need to make a transaction (arrangements about the 
future) 
Consider how similar deals, or events related to this negotiation could influence the deal 
Exhaust every source of information at your disposal (including, but not limited to family, 
friends, co-workers, institutions, the library, and the Internet) 
Research alternative outcomes that satisfy the need of the parties - (i.e., find alternative 
arrangements that meet you and your counterpart's needs) 
Research the ways in which value from the deal could be undermined 
Research creative ways to achieve the goals of the negotiation 
Consider all of the alternative resources your counterpart might be willing to accept 
Calculate the difference between the objective value of your goals and the amount that you 
would be willing to pay for it 
Consider actions third parties could take to influence the price you are willing to pay to achieve 
your goals 
 
Preparing for the negotiation 
 
Communicate in advance your intention to negotiate 
Persuade the counterpart that negotiation is necessary 
Reach an agreement on what overall goals the negotiations will achieve 
Form a plan that details your intentions and behaviors as the negotiations progress 
Plan out opening statements 
Prepare persuasive arguments to present to your counterpart 
Engage in role plays or simulations to deduce counterpart's possible positions, logic, and 
arguments 
Plan a sequence of bargaining activities to achieve your goal 
Seek to understand what might influence you 
Plan concessions you might make during the negotiation 
Plan questions you might ask during the negotiation 
Think about objections your counterpart might raise based on what you're going to say 
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Look for the best ways to obtain the resources you need to secure your goals 
Resolve to be flexible in meeting your goals 
Plan out what positions you might take 
Research if an intermediary is worth the expense for some parts of the negotiation process (e.g., 
brokers, fact finders, etc…) 
Consider how the rules by which negotiations proceed can be used for your advantage 
Plan to be persistent in negotiating to achieve the goals that you and your counterpart set out to 
achieve 
Test to see if your counterpart is serious about negotiating a solution with you 
Make sure all relevant parties will be included in the negotiation 
Establish a shared perception of the situation that requires resolution 
Attempt to remove or minimize distractions that could draw attention away from the negotiation 
Spend time researching the events leading to the negotiation 
 
Bargaining behaviors 
 
Making and exchanging offers 
 
Make the first offer extremely favorable to you 
Resist being influenced by extreme offers from your counterpart 
Test the flexibility of your counterpart 
Make commitments your counterpart would take seriously 
If you make a concession, insist that your counterpart also make a concession 
Make offers that touch on multiple issues 
Evaluate offers against your bottom line 
Consider both the benefits and the downsides of your counterpart's offers 
Try to discover your counterpart's underlying interests 
Try to discover if your offer meets your counterpart's interests 
Make smaller and smaller concessions as negotiations progress 
Try to reach a deal that touches on all of the issues involved 
Justify each offer with persuasive arguments or convincing logic 
Find differences in the way you and your counterpart value the issues 
Request that your counterpart's offers be made in a way that shows their commitment (e.g., 
getting the offer in writing) 
Avoid insulting or offending the counterpart by making extreme offers 
Consider if your interests are met by an offer your counterpart made 
Consider being flexible in how you achieve your goals 
Consider what can be learned by studying the pattern of offers made by your counterpart 
Consider the information you conveyed with the pattern of offers you made 
Compare your counterpart's offers against your aspirations 
Respond to an offer with questions in order to understand why the offer was made. 
Consider obtaining additional resources necessary to reach a deal 
Make concessions that are meaningful to your counterpart 
Make sure the value you stand to gain from the deal is greater than the price/resources paid for it. 
Ensure that the agreement you reached was cemented in an indisputable way 
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Review the final terms with your counterpart to confirm mutual agreement about their 
interpretation 
Engage in a trial-and-error process to see what specific details are acceptable. 
Spend time thinking of the specific pieces of the deal that would satisfy your goals. 
Propose multiple offers that achieves your goals in different ways 
Successively isolate issues that do not belong in the agreement 
Add inducements to the offer so your counterpart is likely to accept it 
Attempt to resolve roadblocks by exploring creative options (e.g., exchanges, side payments, 
and/or compensation). 
Obtain promises on actions on which your counterpart is motivated to carry out anyway 
Attempt to understand the reasons underlying your counterpart's actions 
Evaluate how true your counterpart's statements are 
Deliberately seek to go with the ebb and flow instead of following a tight script 
 
Relationship building 
 
Have plans in advance to deal with counterproductive behavior from your counterpart 
Create and maintain a positive atmosphere while negotiating 
Pave the way for productive relationships in the future 
Reduce the adversarial stance between parties by building goodwill 
Explain your actions before acting in ways that could influence the negotiation 
Create situations where trust can be offered or demonstrated (e.g., handshakes, bows, gestures of 
trust) 
Try to genuinely help your counterpart as well as to meet your own objectives 
Evaluate your counterpart based on their actions during the negotiation 
 
Communication during bargaining 
 
Make sure that you were fully understood 
Listen carefully to understand what your counterpart is trying to say 
Ask questions to learn about your counterpart 
Test your understanding of what your counterpart was trying to say by repeating what they said 
Ask questions that become progressively more specific to fine tune your understanding 
Avoid using evaluative language (e.g., good, bad, favorable, unfavorable) to describe offers or 
issues 
Acknowledge your counterpart's emotions by pointing it out to them (e.g., point out if they 
appear to be happy with the an offer, point out if they appear anxious when you mention a 
particular issue) 
Reward positive actions from your counterpart with encouragement 
Only express desired outcomes 
Be consistent in communicating your intentions to your counterpart 
Maintain a direct line of communication with your counterpart 
Consider what you need to communicate to your counterpart so that they can help you reach your 
goals 
Keep allies or affected parties informed about the proceedings 
Inform your counterpart of the value you bring to the table 
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Make sure there is open communication about the issues 
Make use of all the possible ways of communicating (direct, indirect, public, private) in order to 
accomplish your objectives 
Communicate strategically in order to obtain the information you need to achieve your goal 
Observe your counterpart's actions in order to learn about them 
Consider what your counterpart is trying to tell you in an indirect way 
Give away information only when you intend to 
Allow your counterpart to fully express what they want to say 
Encourage your counterpart to communicate with you 
 
Evaluating the negotiation  
Try to determine if the negotiation is distributive (limited resources to divide) or integrative (you 
and your counterpart's goals are not necessarily at odds with each other) 
Attempt to match your strategies and tactics with the kind of negotiation you are involved in 
Actively update your assumptions about your counterpart's no-deal option as more information 
becomes available 
Actively update your assumptions about your counterpart's bottom line as more information 
becomes available 
Attempt to broaden the scope of the negotiation by introducing more issues 
Be open to rethinking your original goals as new information becomes available 
Check for signs of progress by monitoring the content of the offers across time 
Check for signs of progress by monitoring the quality of communication across time 
 
Strategies and tactics 
 
Remind your counterpart that you have a good no-deal option 
Weaken their no-deal option with persuasive arguments 
Try to focus on satisfying your underlying needs rather than a specific list of requirements 
Attempt to gracefully break a commitment that won't work 
Allow others to gracefully break a commitment that may not work 
Spend time inventing options for mutual benefit 
Attempt to transform a distributive negotiation (where goals are at odds with each other) into an 
integrative one (where goals are not necessarily at odds with each other) 
Attempt to make conditional exchanges - deals where the agreement can change depending on a 
future event (e.g., penalties for delay or bonuses for early completion) 
Keep track of how much value is created by systematically evaluating each offer against 
previous offers 
Attempt to use influence tactics to persuade your counterpart 
Attempt to resist influence tactics from your counterpart 
Propose breaking up an issue into multiple pieces 
Walk away from a negotiation if an agreement is not possible 
Split the difference' between positions or offers 
Allow the counterpart to believe they succeeded while obtaining what you want 
Avoid telling your counterpart your bottom line 
Appear committed to the position or offer you proposed 
Attempt to claim as much of the value created during the negotiation process 
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Spend time during negotiation working toward your goals 
Keep yourself informed of new developments that could affect the negotiation 
Spend time during negotiation finding faults with your counterpart 
Let emotions dictate the way you negotiate 
Keep a record of the negotiations, including offers, demands, and promises made 
Organize all of the information gathered 
Spend time anticipating what your counterpart's next actions will be 
 
Managing the self 
 
Remain aware that your perceptions and thoughts might appear biased to others 
Strive to be consistent in the way you negotiate with others 
Be prepared to counter "dirty" or unethical tactics in a principled way 
Attempt to act within the guidelines you must follow (e.g. industry standards, expectations of 
others, professional guidelines) 
Remain positive about getting a better offer than the one initially offered 
Engage only in ethical behavior 
Appear confident of reaching a desirable outcome 
 
Post-bargaining behaviors 
 
Creating commitment 
 
Express your commitment to the agreement 
Build momentum to close the deal 
After coming to an agreement, continue to look for deals that leave both parties better off 
Craft a deal that creates value and improves the relationship 
Check that you have addressed your counterpart's key concerns 
Stop to check whether the outcome would be good for you and your counterpart before finalizing 
the deal 
 
Professional development 
 
Seek feedback from others about how the negotiation went 
Systematically analyze the negotiation to review what happened and what was learned 
Periodically seek advice about negotiating from a more experienced negotiator 
Periodically seek advice about negotiating from peers 
Systematically analyze your strengths and weaknesses 
Develop a plan to improve the weak aspects of your negotiation skills 
 
Implementation 
 
Keep communication channels open throughout the implementation process 
Agree to a procedure to handle questions about implementing the deal 
Agree on a plan to implement every aspect of the agreement 
Try to make sure both parties are accountable for the implementation of the deal 
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Create plans to protect yourself should your counterpart fail to implement the deal 
Agree to a procedure to resolve disputes about the agreement 
Research ways to extract all of the value created in the deal 
Investigate if the agreement was really as good as you thought it would be 
Communicate your implementation plan to the people affected by the deal 
Stay flexible in order to make the agreement work 
Work to implement the deal immediately after coming to agreement 
Set specific and realistic goals for the implementation process 
Monitor the status of the ongoing relationship  
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Appendix F. Big Five Facet Labels Used in 
Study 3. 
 
Big Five Factor Facets 
Conscientiousness Self-efficacy  
Orderliness  
Dutifulness 
Achievement-striving  
Self-discipline  
Cautiousness 
Neuroticism Anxiety 
Anger  
Depression  
Self-consciousness 
Immoderation  
Vulnerability 
Extraversion Friendliness 
Gregariousness 
Assertiveness 
Activity level 
Excitement-seeking 
Cheerfulness 
Agreeableness Trust 
Morality 
Altruism 
Cooperation 
Modesty 
Sympathy 
Openness Imagination 
Artistic 
Emotionality 
Adventurousness 
Intellect 
Liberalism 
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Appendix G. Means and Standard Deviations 
of Openness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
and Neuroticism Facet Ratings Study 3. 
 
  
 
 
Note. A post-hoc multiple comparison procedure (Tukey HSD) revealed no significant 
differences between facet ratings for given factor within a phase.  
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Appendix H. Glossary Provided to 
Participants in Study 4.  
 
 
 Counterpart - The person you have negotiated with (e.g., your employer) 
 Goals - What you hoped to achieve from the negotiation (e.g., to renegotiate an employment contract) 
 Interests - Your underlying need or set of needs you hope to satisfy (e.g., pay for a vacation) 
 Position - Specific offers or stance you take during a negotiation (e.g., demanding a $5000 dollar raise) 
 Issue(s) - The specific topic or set of topics to be negotiated (e.g., salary, vacation days, bonus amount) 
 Aspiration - Your most optimistic expectations for the negotiation (e.g., getting a $7000 raise with 5 extra vacation 
days) 
 Resources - Things you can bring to a negotiation to use to your advantage (e.g., performance record) 
 Implementation - The process of translating an agreement into concrete actions to finalize the deal (e.g., finalizing 
the new employment agreement by turning it into a formal employment contract) 
 Power - The extent to which someone has influence over the negotiation 
 Value - 'Value' can refer not only to monetary value, but also intangible sources of value, like friendship, trust, and 
goodwill 
 Bottom line - The least you would be willing to accept before walking away from the negotiation 
 No-deal option - The option available to you if you cannot reach agreement on this negotiation 
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Appendix I. Supplementary Dyadic Data 
Analyses for Study 5. 
 
(a) Dyadic effects of Conscientiousness on Individual Outcomes Controlling for Big Five 
and Demographic Variables. 
 
 
 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
 
143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Dyadic effects of Reasoning Ability on Individual Outcomes Controlling for Big Five 
and Demographic Variables. 
 
 
 
Note. HBRI = Hogan Business Reasoning Inventory. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
